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Abstract 
 
This paper employs, for the first time, bank level Boone indicator to measure competition 
in Japan to revisit the underlying linkage with bank risk-taking within the context of an 
extensive quantitative easing program. Japanese banking industry is an interesting case, given 
problems related to notorious nonperforming loans, originated back in the 1990s, whereas still 
causing controversies. We opt for a new measure of bank risk-taking based on a new data set 
of bankrupt and restructured loans. The dynamic panel threshold and panel Vector 
Autoregression analyses enable us to capture the potential endogeneity between the variables 
of interest. Our results demonstrate that quantitative easing and competition reduce bankrupt 
and restructured loan ratios, but also bank stability. Given the adoption of negative rate in 
January 2016 by the Bank of Japan, our study would provide insightful implications for future 
research. 
JEL: G21, C23, E52 
Keywords: Quantitative easing; Boone indicator; bank risk-taking; Japan; dynamic panel 
threshold analysis.  
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1. Introduction 
The competition and bank risk-taking nexus has sparked heated debates (Beck et al., 2013; 
Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005; Jiménez et al., 2013; Tabak et al., 2015). There is extensive research 
that reveals the mixed evidence as they report both positive and negative relationship between 
bank competition and risk (Berger et al., 2009; Fiordelisi & Mare, 2014; Fu et al., 2014; Liu & 
Wilson, 2013). One strand of the literature argues that there are benefits to be derived from 
enhanced competition as it promotes efficiency and prevents banks from taking excessive risk 
(Schaeck & Cihák, 2008; Stiroh & Strahan, 2003). On the other hand, some (Fu et al., 2014; 
Liu & Wilson, 2013) raise concerns due to uncertainties that could be brought by increased 
competition through excessive bank risk-taking. Others argue that stiff competition results in 
loss of high economic rents (e.g. lending opportunities and profit) associated with reduced 
competition, and this has an augmenting effect on risk (Allen & Gale, 2004; Keeley, 1990). 
Hence, whether higher competition destabilises the banking system by accumulating bank risk 
remains yet to reach unanimity. 
In this paper, we build on the existing literature to investigate the relationship between 
bank competition and risk for an interesting market such as the Japanese banking industry. We 
innovate by using bank level Boone indicator to capture competition instead of its aggregate 
value or the Lerner index. As each research setting needs tailor-made research design, we 
address carefully the potential factors that could alter the course of the link between 
competition and risk. The case of Japan is of interest as it faces chronic problems with 
nonperforming loans, and is one of the first economies that an extensive and far-reaching 
program of quantitative easing has been initiated. We tackle the former factor in our measure 
of bank risk-taking by opting for a new data set, whilst we explore the impact of quantitative 
easing through the bank risk channel. Given the significance of quantitative easing for Japan, 
it warrants examining its impact at bank level.  
The emerging of quantitative easing as a monetary policy tool to achieve price stability 
has raised concerns among academics and policymakers about its association with bank risk-
taking (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Claeys & Darvas, 2015). Low short-term interest rates prior to 
loan issuance result in banks granting more new risky loan portfolios, distorting their credit 
supply to favour borrowers with worse credit histories, lower ex-ante internal ratings, and 
weaker ex-post performance (Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014). Less return from 
yields is another motive for financial institutions to accelerate their risk-taking activities 
(Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Rajan, 2005). Banking surveys based on credit standards in the US 
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and the UK, on the contrary, do not suggest an excessive risk-taking by banks as a result of the 
enforcement of quantitative easing (Claeys & Darvas, 2015). However, will this positive 
finding remain when risk is characterised by different proxies, such as nonperforming loan 
ratios and Z-score?  
The Bank of Japan was the pioneer in empowering quantitative easing policy. Currently, 
there has been a strong record of active and aggressive quantitative easing since 2010. We are 
interested in investigating whether the warning of heightened risks associated with this policy 
is supported by Japanese bank level data. Another prominent issue to be addressed is the effect 
of quantitative easing on the link between bank competition and risk. We hypothesise, based 
on the aforementioned literature, that quantitative easing and competition affect bank risk-
taking. On the other hand, is there a mutual relationship between quantitative easing and bank 
competition? After the acute phase of the banking crisis in Japan (1997-1999), the banking 
system underwent major reforms, bailout and consolidation from 1999 to 2003. Their 
competition stance, hence, is expected to vary over time, also in light of the global financial 
crisis 2007-2008. Between 2000 and 2012, quantitative easing was launched twice (during 
March 2001-March 2006 and from October 2010). This could be considered as a 
macroeconomic shock to bank competition due to the relaxation of economic conditions, which 
in turn may affect the competition-risk nexus. The degree of competition in the banking 
industry, however, could also influence the quantitative easing-risk linkage (Altunbas et al., 
2014). Therefore, we control for the effect of quantitative easing when measuring the 
competition-risk relationship, and vice versa. We also explore in depth the underlying causality 
among quantitative easing, competition and risk.  
Apart from Japan’s commitment to do “whatever it takes” in achieving growth through 
quantitative easing, Japan is of interest for the infamous nonperforming loan problem. This 
destructive effect of the banking crisis prolonged to the first half of the 2000s due to the 
reluctance of the government in admitting the nonperforming loan issue. Eventually, when 
doing nothing was too painful to tolerate, the government restructured the whole banking 
industry. However, this restructuring campaign was not to be without controversies as it 
incorporated funding of unprofitable firms, which in turn crowded out solvent firms and 
lengthened the revitalisation of the economy (Caballero et al., 2006). Moreover, there exists 
evidence of political influence, where regulators deferred solvency declaration of banks 
situated in prefectures supporting the then ruling party (Imai, 2009). When quantitative easing 
was first introduced, structural reforms of the financial system were essential for the policy to 
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gain its full effectiveness (Bank of Japan, 2001). After the global financial crisis, 
nonperforming loans of all banks increased slightly from 11.4 trillion JPY in March 2008 to 
12 trillion JPY in March 2009.1 It is noteworthy that during 2008-2013, the government 
strategically aimed to assist small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which are Regional Banks’ 
primary corporate clients, via the SME Financing Facilitation Act. One term in the Act 
involved reclassifying SME’s nonperforming loans. This has alarmed the accumulated hidden 
credit risks within the banking system (Hoshi, 2011), as about 3-6% of total credit in Regional 
Banks was reclassified (International Monetary Fund, 2012).  
Thereby, our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, whereas the 
current literature has mostly used the bank-specific Lerner index or aggregate Boone indicator 
as a proxy for competition (Liu & Wilson, 2013; Schaeck & Cihák, 2014), we innovate by 
providing bank level Boone indicators. Inspired by Delis (2012), we use the local regression 
technique to calculate the Boone indicator for each bank-year observation. Second, we opt for 
an original data set to capture risk that has been overseen by the literature to date. Bank risk-
taking, our primary focus, is represented by bankrupt loan ratio and restructured loan ratio. 
Data on bankrupt and restructured loans are available for Japanese commercial banks and have 
not been used extensively in the Japanese banking literature (Mamatzakis et al., 2015). We also 
use the classical measure of bank default risk, Z-score, to enhance the robustness of our 
analyses. The use of bankrupt and restructured loans at semi-annual data frequency allows an 
enriched information set in our modelling of competition and quantitative easing.2 Third, we 
employ a bank level proxy of quantitative easing – the bank specific lending rate (Delis & 
Kouretas, 2011). The advantages of this microeconomic measure lie on the absence of 
aggregation bias and the ample set of information. This bank-specific variable ensures its 
compatibility with the bank level Boone indicator and risks in our analyses. We also conduct 
the analyses with two other proxies for quantitative easing: the 10-year Japanese government 
bond yield and Bank of Japan total assets. To examine the risk-competition, and risk-
quantitative easing relationships, we employ the dynamic panel threshold analysis, where 
Generalised Methods of Moments type estimators are used to tackle the issues of endogeneity 
(Kremer et al., 2013). This methodology allows us to examine whether these relationships are 
stable over the observed period (financial years from 2000 to 2014) which embraces quite a 
 
1 Source: Japan Financial Services Agency 
2 Bankrupt loans are loans to borrowers in legal bankruptcy and past due loans by 6 months or more. 
Restructured loans are named after the sum of past due loans by 3 months but less than 6 months and restructured 
loans. See Data section and Appendix A for more details. 
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few important events. They are the final phase of the banking crisis (2000-2001), the 
restructuring period (2001-2003), the presence of quantitative easing (2001-2006 and from 
2010), the global financial crisis (2007-2008), and the Tohoku earthquake (2011). Fourth, we 
extend our analysis by using a panel vector autoregression (VAR) approach to address the 
underlying causality and the potential endogeneity among competition, quantitative easing and 
risk.  
Our results show that competition and quantitative easing reduce bank risk in terms of 
bankrupt and restructured loan ratios. However, the former two appear to undermine overall 
bank stability. The results could entail the countervailing effects of quantitative easing on bank 
risk-taking (Buch et al., 2014; De Nicolò et al., 2010). On the one hand, quantitative easing 
alleviates interest rate burden for borrowers and inflates values of pledged assets. On the other 
hand, it may induce banks to engage in riskier projects on the search for higher yield. Along 
these lines, Jiménez et al. (2014) argue that low interest rates reduce the probability of default 
for current variable rate loans, but at the same time banks tend to issue new loans to borrowers 
with worse credit ratings. Regarding the causality between the variables of interest, the panel 
VAR analysis suggests that quantitative easing initiates its causal relationship with risk and 
competition. Regarding competition and risk, the former triggers the relationship with the 
latter.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature and associated 
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the methodologies. Section 4 introduces the data. Section 5 
discusses the results. Finally, section 6 concludes.  
2. Related literature and hypotheses  
In this section, we establish our research hypotheses based on the literature regarding the 
competition-risk nexus and the relationship between quantitative easing and bank risk. The two 
renowned hypotheses about the impact of competition on financial stability, an important part 
of our main investigation objectives, have been well defined in the literature as introduced in 
the following sections.  
2.1 The Competition – Fragility hypothesis 
The underlying theory of this hypothesis poses the view of uncertainty created by a 
competitive banking industry. The rationale behind this is the threat of market share being 
reduced by the entry of newly established banks as well as stronger competence of incumbent 
rivals. The rise in bank competition could be attributed to, e.g., consolidation, deregulation, 
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and technological advances (Berger & Mester, 2003; Jeon et al., 2011; Keeley, 1990). The 
liberalisation of geographic restriction and relaxation in unconventional banking activities have 
also fostered bank competition (Berger & Mester, 2003). There exists evidence suggesting that 
when deregulation took place (e.g. in the US during 1970s–1980s), poor performers were more 
vulnerable due to the incompetence in keeping pace with their counterparts and potential 
entrants (Stiroh & Strahan, 2003). Deregulation also fuelled bank consolidation, resulting in a 
large number of banks disappearing from the market due to mergers (Berger & Mester, 2003). 
In developing banking markets, beside the lift in entry barriers, technological development is 
another catalyst for heightened competition brought by foreign bank entry (Jeon et al., 2011).  
One of the main arguments for greater risks corresponding to increased competition is 
profit reduction. This reasonably serves as a motive for bank managers to take excessive risks 
to pursue business targets, to preserve market shares, and eventually to protect market power. 
Of course, the notion of falling profitability could also raise concerns among banks’ executives 
and jeopardise their position. Consequently, they may have the incentive to stretch their risk 
tolerance ability. Keeley (1990) is among the studies laying the first bricks of the debate of an 
increasing level of fragility in association with intensified competition. The results lend support 
for the hypothesis to the extent that amplified competition lowers bank charter value, which in 
turn promotes extra risk-taking through either higher leverage or asset risk.  
Apart from profitability, a number of factors have been put forward as arguments for the 
competition-fragility hypothesis. Boot and Greenbaum (1992) and Allen and Gale (2004) show 
that in a less concentrated banking market, the arising asymmetric information would 
discourage proper credit screening. Consequently, the rise in credit risk could accumulate the 
latent uncertainty within the banking system. Another fundamental factor of financial safety in 
association with competition is liquidity. Liquidity constraints could be better handled in a 
more concentrated market as information regarding the probability of withdrawal of depositors 
is private (Smith, 1984). Furthermore, as modelled in Allen and Gale (2000), financial distress 
would be less contagious as banks would be willing to provide liquidity to temporarily illiquid 
banks. Other proponents of these views argue that a few large banks in highly concentrated 
markets are easier to supervise than many small banks. Large banks are also more flexible in 
diversifying investment portfolios, which in turn lowers the fragility of the banking system 
(Allen & Gale, 2000). 
2.2 The Competition - Stability hypothesis 
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Contrasting the previous hypothesis, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) propose that market 
concentration intensifies risk. Ceteris paribus, less competition implies that banks could be 
granted more market power; they in turn would impose higher lending rates on loan portfolios. 
The rise in loan rates, thus, could increase bankruptcy probability for borrowers. On the other 
hand, this would magnify the moral hazard incentives within the borrowers themselves in an 
attempt to reap greater returns. 
As opposed to the competition-fragility hypothesis, Caminal and Matutes (2002) present a 
model explaining the ambiguous relationship between market power and bank failure. They 
argue that it is not always valid the argument that higher probability of default is due to higher 
degree of competition. In fact, if investments were assumed to be subject to a large aggregate 
shock, at the presence of intermediate monitoring costs, a monopolistic bank would be exposed 
to more bankruptcy risk than a competitive bank. This arises from less credit rationing which 
can serve as an imperfect substitute for monitoring.  
Advocates of the concentration-stability hypothesis dispute that a few incumbent banks 
are generally easier to be regulated and monitored to prevent contagion risk than in a 
competitive banking industry (Beck, 2008; Beck et al., 2006). Financial support from the 
government to big banks may also prevent a distress time from turning into a crisis (Schaeck 
et al., 2009). Nevertheless, there are still arguments along the lines of the “too-big-to-fail” 
hypothesis, especially in light of financial conglomerates emerging recently as a result of the 
consolidation trend. Yet, such global banks due to the complexity of their operations require 
appropriate regulatory control across borders. However, it is possible that big banks are 
politically powerful to compromise the power of their supervisors (Johnson & Kwak, 2011). 
Even Basel III guidelines would probably not be adequate to account for all the potential risk-
holding aspects of global banks. On the other hand, given that global banks are commonly 
subsidised by the government, their risk-taking motives could be twisted, hence, threatening 
overall financial stability.   
In a similar vein, Anginer et al. (2014) address the issue of systemic risk in association 
with competition on 1872 published banks in 63 countries over 1997-2009. Competition is 
measured by the Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, whereas systemic risk is computed 
from the Merton distance-to-default model. More especially, Anginer et al. (2014) use the 
correlation in risk-taking behaviour obtained from a time series analysis. A bank’s change 
distance-to-default is regressed on average change in distance-to-default excluding the 
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examined bank. The results show that heightened competition leads to more diversified risk-
taking activities which subsequently enhance bank resilience to shocks. 
A growing body of bank competition literature of which empirical findings support the 
competition-stability has adopted the prevailing Boone indicator as a competition proxy. The 
evidence in Schaeck and Cihák (2008) indicates that competition (measured by the Boone 
indicator) stabilises the banking systems in Europe and the US (1995-2005). In a recent study 
examining banks in major European countries, Schaeck and Cihák (2014) confirm their 
previous findings of competition being stability-enhancing. It is noteworthy that the 
relationship is conveyed through the efficiency channel which reallocates profit from cost-
inefficient banks to the cost-efficient ones.  
As the literature has yet to reach a consensus over the two hypotheses, we attempt to revisit 
the competition-risk dispute by investigating their existence in Japanese banking using bank 
level Boone indicator, while taking into account the impact of quantitative easing. The next 
section reviews the relationship between quantitative easing and bank risk as another primary 
investigatory subject in our study. 
2.3 Quantitative easing and risk hypothesis 
After a long history of nearly zero policy rates during the 1990s to avoid deflationary 
slump (Leigh, 2010), the Bank of Japan initiated quantitative easing policy in March 2001 
through long-term government bond purchase. Thereafter, assets purchased were broadened to 
private assets held by private banks, asset-backed securities and asset-backed commercial 
papers (Girardin & Moussa, 2011). Officially ended in March 2006, the first quantitative easing 
period did not firmly prove its effectiveness in detaching the economy from the deflation circle 
(Bowman et al., 2015; Ueda, 2012; Ugai, 2007). 
The importance of quantitative easing has been addressed in its significant impact on 
aggregate demand, financial markets and economic growth (Bowman et al., 2015; Glick & 
Leduc, 2012; Schenkelberg & Watzka, 2013). Regarding its effect on the banking system, the 
bank lending channel is emphasised as a main conduit (Bowman et al., 2015; Hosono, 2006). 
As Lucas (2014) points out, the success of quantitative easing (in the US) is partly indicated 
by increased risk-taking, hence more bank lending. Starting with the zero lower bound interest 
rate policy, Hosono (2006) investigates the different impacts of expansionary monetary policy 
on bank lending. This paper addresses the three important bank characteristics, namely size, 
liquidity and capitalisation, which could alter a bank’s reaction to monetary policy stance. 
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Results indicate that expansionary monetary policy in Japan is less effective for 
undercapitalised banks. Lending of small, less liquid and well-capitalised banks are more 
exposed to monetary policy shocks than their counterparts.  
Inspired by Hosono (2006) but slightly more comprehensive is Bowman et al. (2015), 
which particularly focus on the first quantitative easing period. Bowman et al. (2015) show that 
bank lending, through the transmission of quantitative easing, appears in the liquidity channel. 
The results suggest that liquidity injection of the central bank was inhibited by interbank 
illiquidity, thus the size of credit boosted was relatively small. Unlike findings of Hosono 
(2006), less-capitalised banks benefit more from quantitative easing than their well-capitalised 
peers. Weaker banks, in terms of higher nonperforming loan to asset ratio, also appear to be 
more sensitive to liquidity injection. Bank size is reported to be insignificant in affecting the 
relationship between bank lending growth and liquidity. Kobayashi et al. (2006) also find 
evidence to support that financially weaker banks and firms reap more benefits from 
quantitative easing through positive excess stock returns.  
To this end, to the best of our knowledge, no study has established a clear link between 
quantitative easing in Japan and bank risk-taking using bank level information. Academics and 
policymakers have addressed the potentially disproportionate bank risk-taking associated with 
the enactment of quantitative easing (Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Claeys & Darvas, 2015). 
Quantitative easing is supposed to encourage financial institutions to attempt socially desirable 
risk-taking. However, banks may be deviated from their secured path when excessive risk-
taking is recorded (Claeys & Darvas, 2015). In addition, under lax lending standards and low 
interest rates, the likelihood that more risky borrowers being offered new loans could rise, and 
so could credit risk (Ioannidou et al., 2015; Jiménez et al., 2014). The countervailing effect of 
interest rate changes on bank risk is also addressed in Buch et al. (2014). Lower interest rates 
could reduce the cost burden for borrowers, increase the collateral value, and subsequently 
raise the likelihood of repayment. In parallel, the borrowing capacity rises accordingly to higher 
prices of collaterals, and banks are induced to engage in riskier projects to offset lower profit 
in association with lower interest rates. On the contrary, Lucas (2014) argues that quantitative 
easing could unintentionally reduce bank risk-taking incentives. Banks benefit from the term 
premium in the yield curve if their asset duration exceeds their liabilities’. When the yield curve 
is flat, they may be discouraged in issuing long-term loans which may be more desirable by 
borrowers.  
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In this regard, we leave our quantitative easing-risk hypothesis open: The implementation 
of quantitative easing could lead to either an increase or a reduction in bank risk. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Marginal cost 
In order to attain values for the Boone indicator, we need to model bank marginal cost. In 
line with Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) and Fu et al. (2014), marginal cost is obtained from a 
flexible translog cost function specification3:  
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with total costs TCit, total earning assets Q (loans, investments, and securities) (Delis, 2012), 
price of inputs Pj (which have to satisfy the condition of homogeneity of degree one), time 
trend t and a composed error term εit. Two input prices are incorporated: i) price of funds P1 is 
defined as interest expenses divided by deposits and borrowed funds; ii) price of physical 
capital and labour P2 as noninterest expenses divided by fixed assets4. 
The marginal cost MC for bank i at time t can be derived from equation (1) as follows: 








+++=


=


= 
=
tPQ
Q
TC
Q
TC
Q
TC
Q
TC
MC
j
jj
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it
it 3
2
1
21 lnln
ln
ln
    (2) 
3.2 The Boone indicator 
The Boone indicator of competition has quite a few advantages in comparison with others. 
This measure accounts for both a lift in entry barriers or more aggressive interaction between 
market participants (Boone, 2008b), while other indicators contain limitations or biases. As 
Beck (2008) argues, concentration ratios such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index and three 
(five)-bank concentration ratio are rather unreliable measures of competition as they only 
weigh concentration levels. Concentration ratio could rise following an increase in competition, 
as uncompetitive participants would have to exit the market. Hence, if one interpreted higher 
 
3 Subscripts (it) are omitted for simplification. 
4 Due to data unavailability, we are unable to extract data from general and administrative expenses which 
include personnel expenses and non-personnel expenses associated to physical capital. Hence, we define the 
second input price in line with Fu et al. (2014). 
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concentration ratios as a proxy for uncompetitive markets, the results could be misleading 
(Schaeck & Cihák, 2014). Other measures of competition such as the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic 
and Lerner index also have some limitations. While H-statistic requires a priori assumption of 
long-run equilibrium operating markets (Panzar & Rosse, 1987), it is ambiguous whether the 
Lerner index captures the degree of product substitutability (Vives, 2008). Mirzaei and Moore 
(2014) argue that the H-statistic does not embrace the evolution of bank competition as there 
is only one score obtained over time. Even though time-varying scores are achievable (Bikker 
& Haaf, 2002; Jeon et al., 2011), they are either increasing or decreasing which may be 
inapplicable in effect. 
Introduced by Boone et al. (2007) and Boone (2008b), firms’ (banks’) market power can 
be measured through profit elasticity β in a simple profit equation: 
ititit umc ++= lnln            (3) 
where πit and mcit are profit and marginal costs of bank i at time t. β is the Boone indicator of 
market power which is expected to be negative as higher marginal costs would result in lower 
profits. Intuitively, in a competitive market, inefficient banks signified by comparatively high 
marginal costs are penalised more harshly since they will endure high loss in profits, compared 
to operating in an uncompetitive market. Hence, the larger the absolute value of β, the more 
intense the degree of competition. 
In our paper, we employ the non-parametric methodology used in Delis (2012) to compute 
the Boone indicator for individual banks in each period. This allows us to create bank level 
estimates of competition. We estimate equation (3) by using a local regression analysis5, which 
 
5 According to Loader (1999), a local regression 
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fits the relation between log profits and log marginal costs on the neighbourhood subsample of 
each observation to obtain individual βit.6 
3.3 The Lerner index 
We also use the Lerner index, another proxy of bank market power, to achieve a 
comprehensive analysis with different indicators of competition. The Lerner index is 
formulated as follows: 
( )
itQititQit
PMCPLerner /−=          (4) 
where
itQ
P is output price calculated as operating income divided by earning assets. This 
indicator captures pricing ability above marginal cost, which has been used extensively in the 
banking literature (Berger et al., 2009; Fiordelisi & Mare, 2014; Fu et al., 2014; Koetter et al., 
2012). Values of the index are bounded between 0 and 1, with the former presenting perfect 
competition while the latter indicating pure monopoly. A negative Lerner index entails inability 
to price above marginal cost which might be a consequence of non-optimal behaviour (Fu et 
al., 2014). 
3.4 Dynamic panel threshold analysis 
To examine the risk-competition, risk-quantitative easing nexus, we adopt the dynamic 
panel threshold model introduced by Kremer et al. (2013). This methodology allows for the 
estimation of a threshold effect within a panel data framework involving endogenous 
regressors. Apart from tackling endogeneity concerns, another advantage of this methodology 
in the case of Japanese banking is that no priori assumption needed with regard to structural 
breaks. Such breaks, within the present threshold model, are endogenously determined from 
the underlying data generating process. The model estimates threshold values for competition 
and quantitative easing over times, which in turn signify regime changes.  In some details, the 
model specification is written as:  
yit =mi +b1qitI qit £g( )+d1I qit £g( )+b2qitI qit >g( )+jzit +eit i = 1,...,N( ), t = 1,...,T( )  (5) 
 
6 In regression (3), the Boone indicator is averaged over the entire sample across the whole examined period. 
Put differently, it cannot be measured for individual banks. To overcome this drawback, empirical research has 
modified this model to yield values of β for each period (Schaeck & Cihák, 2014; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011) 
by adding a time dummy and its interaction with marginal costs in order to increase the frequency of the indicator. 
However, the number of observations achieved from this approach does not rise significantly as they are average 
values for each period. 
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where indicates bank-specific fixed effect7; I(.) is the indicator function indicating the regime 
defined by the threshold variable (qit) and the threshold level γ; qit is both the threshold variable 
and the regime-dependent regressor. zit is a vector of control variables, which may include both 
endogenous and exogenous variable. As in Kremer et al. (2013), we account for the regime 
intercept (δ1) because omitting the intercept may result in biases in the threshold estimates and 
regression slopes (Bick, 2010).eit is the error term.8 As in Caner and Hansen (2004) and Kremer 
et al. (2013), we estimate equation (5) using GMM to account for endogeneity. The first lag of 
the endogenous variable is used as the instrument. 
4. Data 
Our data are extracted from semi-annual financial reports of Japanese commercial banks 
published on the Japanese Bankers Association website. Our sample consists of 3491 
observations from financial years 2000 to 2014. Three particular types of commercial banks 
are examined in our study, namely City Banks, Regional Banks I and Regional Banks II. They 
form more than half the banking system and correspond to various types of operations. If City 
Banks involve more in different aspects of banking business, Regional Banks are prone to 
conventional banking activities. City Banks are referred as Main Banks in the horizontal 
keiretsu network – the enterprise groups consisting of one large firm for every major sector 
pre- and post-crisis. These banks act as the core of the business group and offer venture capital 
for affiliates. The number of City Banks has declined over time since the crisis occurred in the 
1990s. Besides, during the restructuring period, City Banks benefited from the tendency of 
mergers in empowering their resistance to overcome the consequences of the crisis9.  
The operating locations of Regional Banks are refined by their scope of business, with 
smaller geographic region restriction for Regional Banks II. These banks are the smallest in 
 
7 To eliminate bank-specific fixed effects, as suggested by Kremer et al (2013), we employ the forward 
orthogonal deviations transformation proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995).  
8 The estimation procedure is as follows. First, a reduced-form regression is estimated for endogenous 
variables as a function of the instrumental variables. Second, using least squares, we estimate equation (5) for a 
fixed threshold with the predicted values of endogenous variables obtained from the first step regression. Third, 
the second step regression is repeated to find the estimator of the threshold value associated with the smallest sum 
of squared residuals. The critical values for the 95% confidence intervals of the threshold value are: 
, with  is the 95% percentile of the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood ratio 
statistic  (Caner & Hansen, 2004). The slope coefficients are estimated by GMM procedure for the formerly 
used instruments and estimated threshold. 
9 Mitsui Bank and Taiyo-Kobe Bank to form Sakura Bank; Fuji, Dai-Ichi Kanyo, and Industrial Bank of 
Japan to form Mizuho Bank; Sanwa and Tokai Banks to form UFJ Banks; UFJ Banks and Bank of Tokyo-
Mitsubishi; Sumitomo Bank and Sakura Bank (Nakamura, 2006) . 
i
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comparison with the other two. Unlike City Banks, Regional Banks mainly invest in 
government bonds and originate loans for small and medium firms in their specific areas where 
their head offices are located. Thus, Regional Banks are more committed to the local 
development of the prefectures. There are other different kinds of banks currently operating in 
Japan, for example, Trust Banks, Long-Term Credit Banks, Shinkin banks (credit 
cooperatives), and foreign banks. Due to data unavailability or differences in business features, 
we do not observe non-commercial banks in our study. 
As dependent variables representing bank risk-taking, we opt for bankrupt loans to total 
assets (BRL ratio), restructured loans to total assets (RSL ratio), and the natural logarithm of 
Z-score10. The first two variables characterise credit risk, whereas the remaining variable is a 
proxy for overall bank stability. They are incorporated respectively in the model to analyse the 
highlighted hypotheses. Bankrupt and restructured loans are obtained from data of risk-
monitored loans disclosed under the Banking Law (see Appendix A). Bankrupt loans are 
named after the sum of bankrupt loans and non-accrual loans,11 while restructured loans are 
the sum of the other two categories: past due loans by 3 months or more but less than 6 months, 
and restructured loans.12 The ratios of these risk-monitored loans to assets capture credit risk, 
similar to nonperforming loan to asset ratio that has been widely used in the literature to test 
for the competition-fragility nexus (Beck, 2008). Bank stability indicated by the Z-score is 
another gauge for the likelihood of bank failure (Beck et al., 2013; Laeven & Levine, 2009). 
This is defined as the number of standard deviations below the mean of returns on assets that 
would result in insolvency by evaporating capital ( ) 
(Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005).  
To ensure the robustness of our estimation, we analyse the dynamic panel threshold model 
with two proxies for competition, the Boone indicator and the Lerner index, with the former 
being our primary interest. With regard to quantitative easing, we choose the bank-specific 
lending rate calculated as interest income on loans divided by loans and bills discounted (Delis 
 
10 Nonperforming loan ratio and Z-score are used extensively in the literature to represent bank risk (Agoraki 
et al., 2011; Beck, 2008; Buch et al., 2012). 
11 Reported in Japanese commercial banks’ balance sheets, these loans are named loans to borrowers in legal 
bankruptcy, and past due loans in arrears by six months or more. 
12 The Japanese Bankers Association originally defined restructured loans as loans of which interest rates 
were lowered. In 1997, the definition was extended to loans with any amended contract conditions and loans to 
corporations under on-going reorganisation (Montgomery & Shimizutani, 2009). 
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& Kouretas, 2011)13. We employ bank-specific lending rate as the threshold variable for 
quantitative easing for several reasons. First, under the zero lower bound interest rate policy, 
short-term interest rates are inoperative (Girardin & Moussa, 2011). Second, the Bank of Japan 
loan rate, uncollateralised overnight call rates, and the Bank of Japan’s total reserves, the 
amount of asset purchases, and government bond yields do not reflect individual bank 
characteristics in relation to changes in quantitative easing. Third, we could avoid aggregation 
bias and enhance the compatibility of quantitative easing proxy with the dependent variable 
and the Boone indicator. For each set of models with different threshold variables, we also 
control for the impact of either competition or quantitative easing. For instance, when proxies 
for competition are treated as threshold variables, quantitative easing will appear among the 
determinants, and vice versa. As quantitative easing influences deposit interest rates, it may in 
turn affect bank competition in the loan market. In addition, one may argue that lending rate is 
not a direct measure of quantitative easing, and may be affected by competition. To tackle the 
potential endogeneity between the three main variables of interest, we treat them as endogenous 
in the dynamic panel threshold model.14 For robustness, we also use the 10-year Japanese 
government bond yield and the Bank of Japan total assets (Lyonnet & Werner, 2012) as other 
proxies for quantitative easing. 
Regarding a subset of explanatory variables, we specify a number of control variables 
varying from bank characteristics to macroeconomic impact. To account for capitalisation and 
the potential moral hazard problem, we use the capital to assets ratio (Tabak et al., 2012)15. 
Bank size is taken as the natural logarithm of total assets (Delis & Kouretas, 2011). We also 
take into consideration the impact of revenue diversification which is the ratio of non-interest 
income to total operating income (Anginer et al., 2014; Beck et al., 2013), assets diversification 
represented by the ratio of securities to assets (Zhang et al., 2013), and liquidity which is 
defined as liquid assets16 to total assets (Jeon et al., 2011). GDP growth is included to reflect 
the influence of macroeconomic environment (Jiménez et al., 2013). Market capitalisation is 
 
13 We could also use the amount of asset purchases or Japanese government bond’s yield as measures for 
quantitative easing (Bowman et al., 2015; Lyonnet & Werner, 2012; Voutsinas & Werner, 2011). 
14 We use the first lag of the endogenous variable as its instrument to preserve information. Following 
Kremer et al. (2013), all available lags of the endogenous regressor are also examined. In fact, the corresponding 
results reveal little variation in the parameters estimated.  
15 As capital ratio is part of the formula of Z-score, we exclude it from models in which lnZ-score is used. 
16 Liquid assets = Cash and due from banks + call loans + receivables under resale agreements + receivables 
under securities borrowing transactions + bills bought + monetary claims bought + trading assets + trading account 
securities + money held in trust (Radić, 2014). 
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accounting for financial market development and also functioning as an alternative source of 
fund for incumbent firms (Beck et al., 2013). Descriptive statistics of data used are displayed 
in Table 1.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
5. Results 
5.1 The Boone indicator 
As introduced in section 3.2, the Boone indicator is estimated for each bank in the sample. 
This provides much more information on competition in the Japanese banking industry than 
other measures. More in details, the average indicator for the entire sample from 2000 to 2014 
is estimated at -0.0542.17 Reported in Mirzaei and Moore (2014), the average Boone indicator 
for Japanese banking between 1999 and 2011 is -0.02.18 Figure 1 illustrates the mean value of 
the Boone indicator over time for all banks in our sample. Its highest score in absolute value is 
recorded in March 2002 at -0.0813, indicating the toughest degree of competition for the entire 
period. During the restructuring period (September 2000 to March 2003), the government 
imposed policy changes on the banking system in order to revitalise its resilience to the 
aftermaths of the crisis. In addition, undercapitalisation and the threat of nonperforming loans 
induced fragile banks to agree to merger proposals from financially healthier banks. The 
consolidation tendency was augmented by a number of mergers between large City Banks, 
indicating an adverse phase for too-big-to-fail banks in maintaining their market power. 
Afterwards, the average score slightly increased to -0.0483 in March 2004 and became 
relatively flat until September 2008. This may serve as evidence in supporting the positive 
outcomes of government intervention. Within that time frame, the turbulence caused by the 
huge amount of nonperforming loans had been alleviated gradually.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
There was a shift in the Boone indicator which signified higher competition during the US 
subprime crisis. At the end of March 2009, the corresponding Boone indicator dropped from -
0.0489 (in September 2008) to -0.0659. The contagion of the global financial crisis possibly 
deviated Japanese banks from their profit goals. The deterioration of profit, in turn, could 
reduce bank market power. Between September 2009 and September 2012, the Boone indicator 
 
17 Delis (2012) includes Japan in the sample of 84 countries. The average Boone indicator for Japanese banks 
during 1988-2005 is -0.584.  
18 Note that the data are obtained from World Bank for the whole banking system. 
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had a similar stable trend as after the restructuring period, before slightly decreased towards 
the end of the sample period. 
The corresponding stiff competition is identified by higher absolute values of the Boone 
indicator. There is no specific benchmark for the value of  in general, yet what we have found 
implies a moderate degree of competition in the banking sector, as the figures are not too distant 
from zero. Table 2 provides further insight of competition among each bank type. In general, 
competition within City Banks (-0.0654) and Regional Banks II (-0.0559) are more intense 
than between Regional Banks I (-0.0518). The largest magnitude (absolute value) of Boone 
indicator is recorded for City Banks in March 2002 at -0.1906. The trend of competition in City 
Banks during the restructuring period is more volatile than those in the other two types, 
indicating the effect of the aforementioned consolidation tendency. The onset of the US credit 
crunch 2007-2008 seemed to impose a pronounced effect on competition between Regional 
Banks II, notably at -0.0809 in March 2009. A potential explanation could rest on the size 
factor which may denote a bank’s resistance to external shocks. Regional Banks II are the 
smallest compared to the other two and operate under more limited geographic restrictions. 
Hence, the potentially high likelihood that Regional Banks II being more exposed to exogenous 
shocks would erode their profits and weaken their market power. Nevertheless, competition in 
Regional Banks II appeared to be more relatively stable compared to City Banks and Regional 
Banks I after the global financial crisis. 
With regard to the Lerner index, its trend over time illustrated in Figure 1 shows support 
for previous findings of the Boone indicator.19 Our result reveals that the average Lerner index 
is 0.2565, with some variation across bank types (the average Lerner index reported for 
Japanese banks from 2003 to 2010 in Fu et al. (2014) is 0.2521). The level of competition is 
relatively tougher for City Banks (0.1467) and Regional Banks II (0.2421) than for Regional 
Banks I (0.2777), in line with the rank of Boone indicators formerly reported for three types. 
The trend of the Lerner index over time is very similar to the pattern of the Boone indicator 
(see Fig. 1). The two points expressing the strongest competitive environment are also observed 
in March 2002 and March 2009. Our results, however, are different from findings of Liu and 
Wilson (2013), possibly because they obtain the Lerner index by estimating the whole banking 
system, including Trust Banks, Shinkin Banks and Credit cooperatives during 2000-2009. 
 
19 There are some exceptional cases when market power characterised by the Lerner index is negative, but 
occasionally found. Agoraki et al. (2011) and Fu et al. (2014) explain the implication of negative Lerner index by 
the non-optimising behaviour of banks which are unable to price above marginal cost. 

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Concerning the three types in our sample, Liu and Wilson (2013) find that City Banks have the 
greatest market power, followed by Regional Banks I and Regional Banks II. Similar 
interpretation is drawn from Montgomery et al. (2014) as large banks enjoy greater market 
power post-mergers. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
5.2 Risk and competition:  The Boone indicator as the threshold variable 
Table 3 reports results from the dynamic panel threshold analysis for the relationship 
between competition and risk, with the Boone indicator as the threshold variable. Columns 1 
to 3 report findings with three proxies for risks (bankrupt loan ratio, restructured loan ratio, and 
lnZ-score, respectively). In the first two models, the threshold values found are very similar to 
each other (-0.0457 and -0.0481 for Models 1 and 2, respectively). The impact of the Boone 
indicator in the low regime is negative and insignificant. In the high regimes, the regime-
dependent coefficients of the Boone indicator are positive and statistically significant (0.5654 
and 0.4257). It suggests that when above the threshold value, the Boone indicator is positively 
associated with bankrupt loan/restructured loan ratios. In other words, the higher the bank 
competition, the lower the risk. Comparing the magnitude of the coefficients, we observe a 
stronger effect when risk is captured by bankrupt loan ratio (0.5654 against 0.4257). Compared 
to restructured loans, bankrupt loans are more detrimental as they have a smaller likelihood of 
recovery. This could suggest a more favourable effect of competition on reducing riskier loan 
portfolios. Our results, therefore, support the competition-stability hypothesis, in line with 
findings of Schaeck and Cihák (2014) for EU banks. Also examining Japanese banks but using 
Z-score to proxy for risk, Liu and Wilson (2013) report the existence of the competition-
fragility hypothesis for all banks during 2000-2009.  
There is a positive relationship between the Boone indicator and lnZ-score in both regimes. 
The parameters reported in column 3 are 0.3231 and 1.156 for the low and high regimes, 
respectively. Thus, in terms of overall bank soundness, competition appears to reduce bank 
stability, supporting the competition-fragility hypothesis. This implication is in line with the 
finding of Liu and Wilson (2013) who also use lnZ-score as an indicator for bank stability. The 
threshold value is identified at -0.1026, putting approximately 94% observations of the sample 
in the high regime (3283). To this end, there is evidence that both competition-risk hypotheses 
exist in Japanese banking. Competition is found to be a risk-reducing factor in terms of credit 
risks, but not in the case of overall bank soundness.  
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We are more confident in the credibility of the former interpretation which support the 
competition-stability hypothesis, since Z-score contains some limitations. As argued in 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2011), Z-score is an accounting-based measure, which may 
not fully reflect the solvency of individual banks, especially if banks are able to smooth out 
data before reporting. Cihák and Hesse (2007) also cast doubts on whether Z-score produces a 
fair measure of default risk across financial institutions. An example given in their study is 
cooperative banks that are less focused on profitability. Another problem of Z-score is the 
volatility measure in the denominator of its formula. Lepetit and Strobel (2013) compare 
different alternatives for the construction of Z-score. They provide evidence that the mean and 
standard deviation of return on assets calculated for the whole sample and the current capital 
ratio best fit their data.20 Our proxies of credit risks are straightforward from balance-sheet 
data. We do not have the issue of comparability discussed in Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache 
(2011) for the use of nonperforming loans, as banks operate under the same reporting rules. 
Furthermore, the data set of bankrupt and restructured loans represents a more realistic picture 
of the problem that Japanese banks encountered. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The number of banks over time in each regime classified by the Boone indicator threshold 
is reported in Table 4. In the low regime, there are 611 (column 1), 562 (column 2), and 208 
(column 3) observations. The high regime consists of many more observations: 2880 (column 
1), 2929 (column 2), and 3283 (column 3). The patterns of the number of banks are rather 
clearer in columns 1 and 2 than in column 3, in which we observe some breaks in September 
2003, September 2007, and March 2009. From September 2003 to September 2007, 
competition appeared less intensified as there were significantly fewer observations in the low 
regimes. From September 2009 to September 2012, a similar trend prevailed. Between March 
2008 and March 2009, the number of observations in the low regime increased quite 
significantly. This highlights tougher competition, probably in connection with the onset of the 
global financial crisis. In column 3, the identification of strong competition may not be obvious 
as the majority of banks are classified in the high regime. However, the threshold value itself 
(-0.1026) signifies a rather high level of competition in comparison to those reported in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 (-0.0457 and -0.0481). 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
20 Tsionas (2014) provides more discussion regarding the limitations of Z-score. 
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The impact of other control variables is a non-trivial concern. Quantitative easing is the 
variable that we consider of particular importance in affecting the risk-competition connection. 
We find a significant and positive impact of bank lending rate on all dependent variables. 
Thereby, while a rise in lending rate would increase bank stability (column 3, Table 3), it would 
also raise bank risk-taking in terms of higher bankrupt/restructured loan ratios (columns 1 and 
2, Table 3). This finding could give support to the argument of Buch et al. (2014). Quantitative 
easing could explain for this reduction in credit risk because lower lending rates mitigate the 
interest burden for borrowers. However, banks may involve in riskier activities to seek for high 
yield so as to compensate for the low interest margin. 
We find a negative impact of capitalisation, assets diversification and liquidity on risk-
monitored loan ratios. Well-capitalised banks are expected to have lower credit risk as the risk 
of capital loss outweighs the temptation from higher returns associated with riskier 
investments, in line with the finding reported in Tabak et al. (2015) for Brazilian banks. 
Concerning the favourable impact of asset diversification on risk, the result proposes that when 
diversifying earning assets, banks would benefit from lower risk-monitored loan ratios. The 
reason could be that managers of banks which have a well-diversified asset portfolio are 
expected to also effectively control their loan-generating practices. Regarding liquidity, banks 
having high liquidity ratio are found to be less sensitive to risk. Liquidity not only enhances 
banks’ resilience to shocks, but also liberates banks in managing outstanding loans, rolling over 
debts and considering prospective loan applications. Highly liquid banks, hence, could be more 
flexible in extending loan maturity or amending loan contracts, which in turn would give 
temporarily troubled borrowers valuable opportunities to defend their financial health and 
commit to loan repayment. 
In terms of bank size and revenue diversification, we find that large banks would have 
higher restructured loan ratio (column 2, Table 3), but also higher overall bank stability 
(column 3, Table 3) compared to their smaller peers. This could be explained through the 
segmentation of Japanese banking. Loan financing of systemically important banks, e.g. City 
Banks, is not refined within specific locations and particular types of borrowers. This may 
increase the likelihood of greater restructured loan ratio in comparison to small banks. 
However, it is more likely for too-big-to-fail banks to prevent restructured loans from 
transferring to bankrupt loans as they could benefit from various funding sources and better 
access to information. These advantages could also enhance bank stability. Moreover, as a 
feature of the keiretsu network, Japanese City Banks have strong ties with their clients (Lincoln 
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et al., 1996). Management assistance from City Banks could aid temporarily distressed 
borrowers to reverse the situations. Affiliated firms could benefit from strategic advice of their 
Main banks to encounter challenging periods. Our results support Liu and Wilson (2013) to the 
extent that Japanese large banks are less risky than their smaller peers. In terms of the impact 
of revenue diversification, an increase in this ratio is reported to enhance bank soundness 
(column 3, Table 3). The more diversified the bank is in business activities, the less risk it may 
incur. Nguyen et al. (2012) also report that South Asian banks are more stable in response to 
diversifying their income.  
Turning to the influence of macro-economic variables, an increase in GDP growth would 
positively affect risk-monitored loan ratios. Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2006) argue that the 
pro-cyclical bank lending pattern is supposed to influence bank risk since banks are more likely 
to relax lending standards and expand credit during economic upturn. Nevertheless, the result 
indicates a favourable impact of GDP growth on bank stability (column 3, Table 3), in line 
with Agoraki et al. (2011). With regard to the effect of market capitalisation on risk, our result 
denotes that the development of the stock market would have a positive effect on the banking 
market through lower rate of bankrupt loans (column 1, Table 3) and higher bank soundness 
(column 3, Table 3). There is a weak implication that firms can seek funding from alternative 
markets to repay their debts. However, in developed financial markets, credit information 
sharing would easily assist creditors to detect firms with bad reputation and moral hazard 
behaviour (Beck et al., 2013).  
Table 5 reports the results for the competition and risk relationship with other proxies of 
quantitative easing. We find consistent threshold values for the Boone indicator, as well as its 
relationship with risk across models. The magnitudes of the impact of the threshold variable 
on the dependent variable are also very similar to those reported in Table 3. In particular, 
competition is found to reduce credit risk (high regimes, columns 1 to 4), but enhance bank 
soundness (columns 5 and 6). As lower bond yield and higher Bank of Japan assets indicate 
more aggressive quantitative easing (Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Lyonnet & 
Werner, 2012), results in columns 1 to 4 show that quantitative easing reduces risk-monitored 
loan ratios, in line with results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. This relationship is drawn from 
a positive association between bond yield and bankrupt/restructured loan ratios (columns 1 and 
3), and a negative association between these ratios and Bank of Japan assets (columns 2 and 
4). For the impact of control variables, there is little variation in terms of signs and magnitudes, 
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with an exception of revenue diversification. This variable reveals a statistically significant 
effect in reducing risk-monitored loan ratios (columns 1 to 4).  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
5.3 Risk and quantitative easing:  Quantitative easing as the threshold variable 
Findings for the risk-quantitative easing nexus are reported in Table 6. There exists a 
positive relationship between lending rate and risk in all different model specifications 
(columns 1 to 3). A rise in lending rate is found to increase bankrupt/restructured loan ratios 
and lnZ-score, statistically significant in both regimes. When risk is measured by bankrupt loan 
ratio and restructured loan ratio, the threshold value is identified at 1.2052% (column 1) and 
1.0562% (column 2). When lnZ-score is in play, the threshold value is 0.9401% (column 3). 
To this end, quantitative easing is beneficial in terms of reducing credit risk. The effect is more 
prominent in the high regimes, where the coefficients are 0.037 (column 1) and 0.0385 (column 
2). Although the coefficients indicating the impact of lending rate on risk-monitored loan ratios 
in the low regimes are statistically significant, the magnitude is quite negligible (0.0088 and 
0.0063 in columns 1 and 2, respectively). Nevertheless, this favourable effect of lower risky 
loan ratios associated with quantitative easing may be at the expense of bank stability. The 
reason is that, reported in column 3, lnZ-score is also reduced, given an aggressive quantitative 
easing policy. Notably, the magnitude of the coefficients for the impact of lending rate provides 
insightful implications. Compared to the detrimental effect that quantitative easing could 
impose on bank stability (0.3416 and 0.2833 in the low and high regimes, respectively), the 
beneficial impact that it exerts on credit risk is quite small. In a nutshell, comparing the results 
to the hypotheses set out in section 2, we can conclude that quantitative easing could lower 
credit risk but may harm overall bank stability.  
In an attempt to explain the aforementioned findings, the implication of variability in our 
results could be interpreted by the countervailing effect of low interest rates on bank risk-taking 
as discussed in Buch et al. (2014). On the one hand, quantitative easing may reduce risk, as it 
aims to facilitate lending so that increased investment could boost economic growth. Both 
banks and borrowers can benefit from ample liquidity injected by quantitative easing to 
strengthen their resistance to exogenous shocks. Low interest rates would encourage more 
potential borrowers to apply for funding because of a greater probability of fulfilling their 
repayment duties. Evidenced in Jiménez et al. (2014), low interest rate reduces the cost burden 
of existing loans for borrowers. Therefore, lower bankrupt/restructured loan ratios would be 
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expected. On the other hand, quantitative easing could amplify risk. When banks foresee an 
extended period of low interest rate, they may alter their risk-taking appetites towards riskier 
projects to pursue greater gains (Altunbas et al., 2014; Gambacorta, 2009). In more details, low 
yield and abundant liquidity accelerate asset prices and promote leverage, in turn induce 
excessive risk-taking (Dell'Ariccia et al., 2010). Larger loanable proportion of collaterals and 
the search for yield (Rajan, 2005) may drive banks to grant more risky loan portfolios (Jiménez 
et al., 2014), or to invest in higher yield-higher risk instruments. Another risk-taking channel 
could be through a typical type of moral hazard, where banks realise the continuity of 
quantitative easing policy in difficult economic times. As Altunbas et al. (2014) argue, banks 
may perceive the presence of a so-called insurance effect, in which the enforcement of 
monetary easing is expected during financial downturn to decelerate the fall of asset values. 
The prediction of lower probability of large downside risk, therefore, would magnify bank risk-
taking. This perception may well be the case of prolonged low interest rate and extensive 
quantitative easing in Japan. Taken together, these arguments could explain for lower bank 
stability corresponding to quantitative easing. 
 [INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Interestingly, in terms of control variables, the results reveal a negative association 
between the Boone indicator and risk-monitored loan ratios. Hence, greater competition would 
be harmful for banks because of higher bankrupt/restructured loan ratios. This finding is 
reinforced by the positive association between the Boone indicator and lnZ-score in column 3, 
indicating higher bank stability in lower competition. In this case, when competition is a control 
variable, the results do not uncover its desirable impact in reducing risky loan ratios shown in 
columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. The impact of other determinants in Table 6 is similar to findings 
reported in Tables 3 and 5, with minor variation. In particular, in terms of diminishing risk and 
enhancing bank soundness, there are four variables: capital ratio, asset diversification, liquidity 
and market capitalisation. In contrast, higher GDP growth is found to increase risk-monitored 
loan ratios, probably due to the softened lending standards during good economic times 
(Dell'Ariccia & Marquez, 2006). Turning to Z-score, there is a favourable impact on bank 
stability during economic upturn and when banks divert their focus to noninterest income. Bank 
stability increases corresponding to larger bank size, while bankrupt loan ratio decreases.  
The number of banks in each regime is shown in Table 7. Analysing the trend of the 
number of observations in column 1, we observe a significant increase of banks in the low 
regime after the global financial crisis. Especially, from March 2011 to March 2015, almost all 
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banks in the sample charged less than 1.2052% lending rate. Note that this time frame covers 
the on-going quantitative easing policy (since October 2010). Illustrated in column 3, the 
distribution of the number of banks in the low regime provides further evidence for the initial 
quantitative easing period. Recall that the threshold value for column 3 is 0.9401%, which is 
lower than the values for columns 1 (1.2052%) and 2 (1.0562%). From September 2003 to 
March 2006, the number of banks charging lending rate lower than 0.9401% increased 
monotonically. This tendency indicates the effect of the first quantitative easing period (March 
2001-March 2006). In the high regimes of all model specifications, it is confirmed that the 
number of observations gradually decreased during this period. 
 [INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 8, we use the 10-year Japanese government bond yield (columns 1 to 3) and Bank 
of Japan assets (columns 4 to 6) to replace lending rate as the threshold variable. The results 
show a positive influence of bond yield on lnZ-score in both regimes of column 3. This is in 
line with previous findings of quantitative easing reducing bank stability, reported in column 
3 of Table 6. The magnitude of the impact in the high regime (0.6513, column 3) is also notable 
compared to other models. Interestingly, bond yield affects risk-monitored loan ratios 
differently in two regimes. There is a statistically significant positive relationship between bond 
yield and bankrupt/restructured loan ratio in the high regimes. The coefficients of bond yield’s 
impact are 0.0131 (column 1) and 0.0107 (column 2). This relationship turns out negative in 
the low regimes (-0.017 in column 1 and -0.0149 in column 2). It is also worth noting that the 
absolute magnitudes of the impact of bond yield on risk-monitored loans in the two regimes 
are approximately the same (around 0.01). Additionally, the threshold value is consistently 
realised at 1.032%. Thus, when bond yield is below 1.032%, quantitative easing increases 
credit risk. In this regard, more aggressive quantitative easing would encourage banks to enrol 
more risk. First, banks may tend to soften lending standards due to low yield and interest rate, 
thereby issuing loans to less creditworthy borrowers (Jiménez et al., 2014). Second, as 
Ioannidou et al. (2015) argue, due to low monetary policy rate, banks may be less concerned 
about the compensation which should be required for the higher risk taken. In fact, Ioannidou 
et al. (2015) find that during monetary expansion, banks charge riskier borrowers relatively 
less than what they would. When bond yield is greater than 1.032%, quantitative easing reduces 
credit risk, similar to our previous conclusion drawn from lending rate (Table 6).  
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
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The periods where bond yield is lower than the threshold value (1.032%) happened in 
March 2003, September 2010, and from September 2011 to March 2015. The last time frame 
includes the current quantitative easing period. If we combine this finding with the 
aforementioned impact of the threshold, the on-going quantitative easing may pose a threat to 
the banking system by augmenting credit risk. Regarding control variables, similar to the 
results reported in Table 6, we also find that competition increases credit risk and bank fragility. 
Larger size, higher capital ratio, more liquidity, greater asset diversification, revenue 
diversification and market capitalisation would help lower credit risk. Higher GDP growth, on 
the other hand, would increase credit risk exposure. In terms of bank stability, it would be 
enhanced following larger bank size, more diversified income, higher GDP growth, and greater 
market capitalisation.  
A first glance at columns 4 to 6, where the Bank of Japan total assets are used to proxy for 
quantitative easing, reveals a consistent estimate of the threshold value at 118,437,502 mil JPN. 
There is a negative association between the Bank of Japan assets and risk variables. For credit 
risk, this relationship is statistically significant in the low regime (-0.0347 in column 4 and -
0.0286 in column 5), implying a favourable impact of quantitative easing. The influence of 
Bank of Japan assets on risk-monitored loan ratios in the high regime is insignificant. 
Differently, for bank stability, when the Bank of Japan assets are greater than the threshold, 
more aggressive quantitative easing policy would reduce bank soundness (-0.1709 in column 
6). The relationship between quantitative easing and bank stability is insignificant in the low 
regime. These results strengthen those reported in columns 1 to 3, where bond yield is the proxy 
for quantitative easing. Up to a certain level of asset purchases (118,437,502 mil JPN), 
quantitative easing lessens credit risk. When the amount of asset purchases passed the 
threshold, quantitative easing reduced bank stability. 
The time frame in each regime complements these findings. First, the periods of high 
regimes coincide with the two quantitative easing periods. In particular, the amount of asset 
purchases which were higher than the threshold are recorded from March 2001 to March 2006, 
and from March 2011 to March 2015. Hence, the more asset purchases of the Bank was not 
really effective due to its detrimental impact on bank stability. Second, the period of low 
regimes falls in to the gap between the two quantitative easing periods, and also embraces the 
global financial crisis. During this interval (September 2006-September 2010), more asset 
purchases would mitigate credit risk. However, overall, the estimated impact suggests that the 
reduction in credit risk may not be considerable compared to the reduction in bank soundness 
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(e.g. -0.0347 in column 4 versus -0.1709 in column 6). The influence of other control variables 
appears consistent as previously reported in columns 1 to 3 and in Table 6. 
5.4 Competition and quantitative easing: Quantitative easing as the threshold variable 
As quantitative easing affects risk and thereby indirectly competition, it is worth exploring 
whether the former asserts a direct effect on bank competition. To test this hypothesis, we apply 
threshold modelling where competition is the dependent variable and quantitative easing is the 
threshold variable. We respectively include a number of control variables such as risk, as 
measured by bankrupt loan ratio, restructured loan ratio, and lnZ-score. In addition, we also 
include some environmental variables such as bank size, capital ratio, asset diversification, 
revenue diversification, liquidity, GDP growth, and market capitalisation. The results are 
reported in Table 9.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
In Table 9, the proxy for quantitative easing – the bank lending rate – is the threshold 
variable, whereas the Boone indicator is the dependent variable. The threshold values for 
lending rate are 0.8496% (column 1), 0.6935% (column 2), and 0.7397% (column 3), 
corresponding to different risk variables included in the models. The important finding is the 
different impacts that lending rate places on the Boone indicator. It is positive in the low 
regimes, and negative in the high ones. The former implies that more aggressive quantitative 
easing would cause higher competition. In contrast, the latter indicates lower competition in 
response to a more extensive quantitative easing program. The magnitude of the effect of 
quantitative easing on competition is larger in the low regimes (0.0905; 0.0667; 0.1095 
compared to -0.0657; -0.0276; -0.0805), although the numbers of observations in the low 
regimes are significantly fewer. 
The number of observations in each regime enlightens the implication of our findings 
(Table 10). Overall, the high regimes outnumber the low ones. The number of banks classified 
in the low regime only started increasing significantly recently, particularly, since September 
2010 in column 1, March 2013 in column 2, and September 2012 in column 3. Based on the 
threshold values, more banks in the sample experienced a decrease in competition as a result 
of greater quantitative easing, considerably before the second quantitative easing period. After 
September 2012 to March 2015, there was an upward trend of the number of banks charging 
lending rate lower than the threshold, corresponding to the extensive quantitative easing 
program.  
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[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
Based on our results, during the first two third of the sample period, the majority of banks 
in the sample are found to enjoy a less competitive environment brought by quantitative easing. 
The reason could be due to the implicit subsidisation from the government. First, quantitative 
easing policy aims to facilitate investment and spending through lowering lending rates paid 
by households and businesses (Wright, 2012). As a result, financial institutions are injected 
with ample liquidity to increase loan financing at low rates. Second, quantitative easing may 
generate the standard case of moral hazard which is the insurance effect discussed in Altunbas 
et al. (2014). Banks are less concerned about the fall of asset values as they could predict an 
extension of the program, or at least the prolonged low short-term interest rate, which could 
serve as a cushioning effect to prevent further downturn. Thereby, the threat of closure if they 
take on more risk would not be too high. Besides, according to Boone (2008a), more intense 
competition is a result of an increase in the number of firms in the industry, more aggressive 
interaction between firms, or a fall in costs of other incumbents. In the case of Japan, the 
number of commercial banks from the first quantitative easing period to before the second one 
did not change significantly, indeed, decreased slightly. We conjecture it is the relaxed 
economic condition and the implicit government protection that quantitative easing created less 
competition in the banking industry. 
From September 2010 onwards, more banks are categorised in the low regime in which 
they face intense competition due to quantitative easing. It could be the case that Japanese 
commercial banks have become close substitutes as quantitative easing facilitates the whole 
banking system more extensively in the second program. Furthermore, as set out in its 
monetary policy statement on 30/10/2012, the Bank of Japan has committed to provide banks 
with unlimited long-term funding to match the net increase in loan financing to non-financial 
sectors. Being closer substitutes indicates more aggressive interaction between banks. As 
shown in Boone (2008a), it is a condition for more intense competition. 
In terms of control variables, the impact of bank stability on the Boone indicator is positive, 
in line with the positive association between the Boone indicator (as the threshold variable) 
and lnZ-score, which we find for both regimes in column 3 of Table 3. Higher capital ratio and 
GDP growth reduce competition, similar to findings of Delis (2012). Capital-abundant banks 
tend to exercise their market power more greatly than their peers. These banks could be able to 
define their own high margin and take advantages of variable funding sources which result in 
lower costs. Higher liquidity ratio, in contrast, would lead to greater competition. 
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We further replace lending rate with bond yield and Bank of Japan assets. The relationship 
with the Boone indicator is reported in Table 11. Unlike lending rate, the analysis identifies a 
consistent positive relation between bond yield and the Boone indicator in both regimes 
(columns 1 to 3), while it is negative for the Bank of Japan assets (columns 4 to 6). The impact 
is statistically significant in almost all regimes, except the high one in column 6. The threshold 
estimates for bond yield are 1.33% (columns 1 and 3) and 1.685% (column 2). The 
corresponding time periods when the threshold values were recorded are March 2005 and 
September 2007. The impact of bond yield on the Boone indicator is more pronounced in the 
high regimes (0.0655, 0.5397, and 0.042 compared to 0.0149, 0.0113, and 0.009). With the 
Bank of Japan assets, we also find two threshold values. Reported in columns 4 and 6, it is 
121,771,462 mil JPN recorded in March 2001, which marked the start of the first quantitative 
easing program. In column 5, the threshold estimate is 124,746,234 mil JPN recorded in 
September 2011. To this end, these results suggest that greater quantitative easing would lead 
to more intense competition. Besides, the different impacts of quantitative easing on 
competition between regimes are revealed only when lending rate is used. 
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
5.5 Robustness check with the Lerner index as a competition proxy 
We further conduct the dynamic panel threshold analysis, replacing the Boone indicator 
by the Lerner index to examine the robustness of our findings. The results are reported in Tables 
A1 to A7 in the Appendix. 
For the risk and competition relationship (Table A1), the threshold values are 0.2661 
(column 1), 0.2835 (column 2), and 0.4117 (column 3). Unlike the Boone indicator, the Lerner 
index exhibits a negative relationship with risk-monitored loan ratios (columns 1 and 2). The 
results show that higher competition would lead to an increase in bankrupt loan ratio in both 
regimes and restructured loan ratios in the low regime. However, although statistically 
significant, the economic impact is not very strong. The reason is that in column 1, the 
parameters are significant at the 10% level in both regimes (-0.0116 and -0.0018), and the 
magnitude of the impact of the Lerner index in column 2 is quite small (-0.005 for the low 
regime). The positive relation between the Lerner index and lnZ-score in the low regime of 
column 3 (0.1878) also suggests that competition reduces bank stability. Overall, by using the 
Lerner index, we find a presence of the competition-fragility hypothesis. This is in line with 
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the results reported in column 3 of Table 3. The distributions of the number of observations in 
each regime are reported in Table A2.  
Consistent with findings for the impact of covariates in columns 1 to 3 of Table 3, we find 
a desirable effect of capitalisation, asset diversification, liquidity, and market capitalisation in 
reducing risk. Higher GDP growth and lending rate, in contrast, would engage banks in higher 
credit risk exposure. Therefore, quantitative easing would introduce a stabilising effect on 
credit risk, but not on bank soundness as we find a positive impact of higher lending rate on 
lnZ-score (column 3). The impact of bank size is important for restructured loan ratios and 
bank stability, while revenue diversification is a significant determinant in all model 
specifications. However, the influence of revenue diversification on risk variables varies. The 
more diversified a bank, the higher the risk-monitored loan ratios, but at the same time, the 
higher the bank stability.  
In Table A3, we report the results with bond yield and Bank of Japan assets as proxies for 
quantitative easing. The impact of the Lerner index in each regime and the threshold values 
across columns 1 to 6 remains similar to those reported in Table A1. Regarding the impact of 
other control variables, the results also do not vary significantly. 
Table A4 shows the results for the relationship between risk and quantitative easing, where 
the Lerner index is a control variable, and lending rate is the threshold variable. The threshold 
values of lending rate in columns 1 and 2 are consistent with those reported in columns 1 and 
2 of Table 6. The impact of lending rate on risk-monitored loan ratios remains positive and 
significant in both regimes. Some variation is found for bank stability. The threshold of lending 
rate in column 3 is 0.6929%, positively related to bank stability, and statistically significant in 
the low regime only (the coefficient is 0.6754). To this end, our previous conclusion of less 
credit risk and higher bank fragility associated with greater quantitative easing remains 
unchanged, regardless of competition proxies. When we use bond yield and Bank of Japan 
assets as the threshold variable (Table A5), this conclusion is upheld, but minor variability 
exists. For example, compared to column 1 of Table 8, column 1 of Table A5 shows a positive 
impact of bond yield on bankrupt loan ratio in both regimes. Therefore, if using only the Lerner 
index, we may miss the different impacts that bond yield could impose in different regimes.  
Regarding the relationship between competition and quantitative easing, compared to the 
aforementioned results with the Boone indicator, we find that in the case of Lerner index 
capturing competition, the nexus between competition and quantitative easing is clearly 
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negative (columns 1 to 3 of Table A6). It is statistically significant in both regimes with the 
threshold value identified at 0.692%. It appears that by focusing only on the Lerner index we 
would have missed the change in the sign of the relationship between competition and 
quantitative easing between two regimes. Replacing lending rate by bond yield and Bank of 
Japan assets, the results shown in Table A7 are similar to those reported in Table 11. In more 
details, the Lerner index is positively related to bond yield and negative related to Bank of 
Japan assets. The threshold values are consistent at 1.33% for bond yield and 124,746,234 mil 
JPN for the Bank of Japan assets. Hence, more aggressive quantitative easing would lead to 
more intensified competition. 
5.6 The panel VAR specification 
Given some variability in our results, which could be driven by endogeneity issues, we 
attempt to address the underlying dynamics between risk, competition, and quantitative easing. 
We adopt the methodology of panel vector autoregression (VAR) to account for the causality 
relationship as well as the existence of unobservable heterogeneity, specified by an individual 
specific term. An advantage of the model is assumption-free for the relationship between 
variables. We treat all three variables in the equation system as endogenous. 21  Risk, taken as 
bankrupt loan ratio, restructured loan ratio, and lnZ-score, is incorporated respectively in the 
analysis. The Boone indicator and lending rate are proxies for competition and quantitative 
easing, respectively. We also include bank size as an exogenous control variable because of its 
importance in the Japanese banking structure. As discussed in the Data section, City Banks are 
the biggest in size and operate in a wide range of geographic regions, whereas Regional Banks 
II are the smallest. The nature of banking business also varies across three types. Besides, two-
big-to-fail City banks are at the centre of the keiretsu network as well as being the important 
nodes channelling the impact of quantitative easing.  
Following the estimation of panel VAR, we derive the Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) 
(Fig. 2 to 4), which enable us to interpret the reaction of one variable to a shock in another 
variable in the system. We also report the Variance Decomposition (VDCs) for forecast 
horizons of 5 and 10 periods to illustrate the variance of the response variable corresponding 
to a shock in another variable (Table 12). All model specifications satisfy stability condition.22 
 
21 Following Love and Ariss (2014), we run the model on lag order 1 to preserve information. 
22 The variables enter the equation system as endogenous, with the most exogenous ones appearing first 
(Love & Zicchino, 2006). Following Love and Zicchino (2006), fixed effects are removed by using the Helmert 
procedure (Arellano & Bover, 1995).  
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[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Regarding the risk-competition nexus, a shock to the Boone indicator has a negative and 
significant impact on bankrupt loan ratio (Fig.2, second row, first column). This negative 
relationship is in line with the results reported in Tables 6 and 8. Fig. 4 (second row, first 
column) reveals a positive and significant response of lnZ-score to shocks in the Boone 
indicator. This positive association is similar to findings of Tables 3, 5, 6, and 8. Restructured 
loan ratio, on the other hand, does not show a significant response to shocks in the Boone 
indicator. In terms of reverse causality, shocks in risk variables generate insignificant responses 
of the Boone indicator. Two scenarios can be at play to interpret the results. First, a positive 
shock in the Boone indicator which denote lower competition will lead to decreased credit risk 
and increased bank stability. This case gives support to the competition-fragility hypothesis. 
Second, a negative shock in the Boone indicator, referred as higher competition, will cause 
bankrupt loan ratio to decline and enhance bank stability. This situation is in line with the 
competition-stability hypothesis. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In terms of the risk-quantitative easing nexus, in the short-term, there is a positive and 
significant response of risk-monitored loan ratios to a one standard deviation shock in lending 
rate (Fig. 2-3, last row, first column). This positive reaction is similar to the findings in Tables 
3 and 6. There is no evidence for a significant response of bank stability to a shock in lending 
rate. The diagrams also reveal insignificant responses of lending rate to shocks in risk variables. 
Thus, if there exists a positive shock in lending rate, which translates into decreased 
quantitative easing, credit risk could rise accordingly. Hence, the simulation base of panel VAR 
could reinforce the claim of lower credit risk as a result of quantitative easing.  
 [INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The first order VAR model takes the form of: TtNieww tiitiit ,...,1;,...,1,1 ==++= −      (7) 
where wit is a vector of three random variables: quantitative easing QE, Competition Comp and risk R (bankrupt 
loan ratio, restructured loan ratio and lnZ-score), Φ is a 3x3 matrix of coefficients, μi is a vector of m individual 
effects, and ei,t is a multivariate white-noise vector of m residuals. The equation system to be estimated with lag 
order one is as follows:  
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Turning to the competition-quantitative easing linkage, diagrams from the IRFs yield 
consensus findings for the relationship between these two aspects across different proxies for 
risk. A shock in lending rate would generate a negative response in the Boone indicator, 
marginally significant in the short-run (Fig. 2-4, last row, second column). Investigating the 
reverse causality, we observe an insignificant response of lending rate to a shock in the Boone 
indicator (Fig. 2-4, second row, last column). These findings are in line with the negative 
association between lending rate and the Boone indicator reported in the high regimes of Table 
9. If the shock in lending rate is positive, which represents reduced quantitative easing, 
competition would increase. Yet, if there is a negative shock in lending rate, quantitative easing 
would cause higher competition. 
Complementing findings of the IRFs, the VDCs show that changes in competition is 
important in explaining the variation in bankrupt loan ratio (5.66%), restructured loan ratio 
(1.26%) and lnZ-score (12.79%) (Table 12, 10 periods). In contrast, about 0.36% and 12.4% 
variation in the Boone indicator is due to innovations from restructured loan ratio and lnZ-
score, respectively. Variation of bankrupt loan ratio does not explain the variation in 
competition at all. Findings from the IRFs and VDCs reveal that competition triggers its 
relationship with risk. 
[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
Regarding the risk-quantitative easing relationship, about 46.79% variation in bankrupt 
loan ratio is explained by variation in quantitative easing, while only 0.03% variation in 
quantitative easing is explained by shocks in bankrupt loan ratio. Similarly, 30.89% variation 
in restructured loan ratio is due to shocks in quantitative easing, while 0.07% variation in 
quantitative easing is explained by changes in restructured loan ratio. Differently, changes in 
quantitative easing is not so important in explaining the variation of bank stability. The reason 
is that while 3.01% variation in lending rate is due to innovations in lnZ-score, only 0.68% 
variation in lnZ-score is attributed to variation in lending rate. To this end, along with results 
from the IRFs, quantitative easing is found to originate its relationship with risk. 
The variation in the Boone indicator indicated by variation in lending rate is 
distinguishably larger than the variation in lending rate explained by changes in the Boone 
indicator (8.35%, 6.14%, 10.3% in comparison to 0.01%, 0.01%, 0.12% in columns 1-3, 
respectively). A conclusion of the causality starting from quantitative easing to competition 
can be drawn. 
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6. Conclusion 
Revisiting the risk-competition debate using the dynamic panel threshold analysis, we find 
evidence to support the competition-stability hypothesis in Japanese banking, to the extent of 
credit risk. In more details, competition represented by the bank-level Boone indicator is found 
to reduce bank risk-taking by diminishing bankrupt and restructured loan ratios. However, this 
desirable effect may be offset by a decrease in overall bank stability. Similarly, regarding the 
risk-quantitative easing nexus, a more extensive quantitative easing program would assist 
banks in lowering their risk-monitored loan ratios. Yet, it could threaten bank solvency. Further 
exploring the causality relationship between competition, quantitative easing and risk, we find 
that competition and quantitative easing cause risk in most models.  
Our findings indicate that in an environment where quantitative easing is taking place, 
banks might find it more challenging to compete with their counterparts. To improve their 
competitiveness, banks could strengthen their competence from other aspects, e.g. 
capitalisation, liquidity, and asset diversification. Bank executives could enhance banking 
services by, e.g., diversifying their investments or increasing unconventional business activities 
to offer more benefits to their customers in time and cost savings. In addition, focusing on 
relationship banking, improving their flexibility in debt rollover, and operating more efficiently 
may also be among the tactics bringing banks ahead their rivals. The proposed threshold values 
for lending rates and the Boone indicator in this study may also be useful for bank managers to 
construct their risk management policy.  
For policymakers, e.g. the Japan Financial Services Agency, relaxing entry and exit for the 
banking industry, promoting small and medium sized banks, or disentangling business 
operation restrictions could create a competitive environment which in turn would diminish 
bank risk-taking. Policymakers could also encourage the mutual assistance prevailing under 
the keiretsu network. Note that a disadvantage of keiretsu affiliation is that main banks could 
exert their monopoly power in loan financing. Our analyses show that attempts to discourage 
competition increase credit risk. Therefore, our results argue that keiretsu should be applied 
with extreme caution. 
Last but not least, to take into account the stability of the banking system while exerting 
quantitative easing, regulators may revise rules associated with the initial credit screening and 
barriers in lending principles. In more details, avoiding incorrect evaluations at the beginning 
of the loan generating process and complying with lending standards help banks lessen the 
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possibilities of future uncertainty. These policies should not contradict with but promote the 
efficacy of quantitative easing and the Abenomics - the current monetary and economic growth 
policy. Given that the Bank of Japan has adopted negative interest rate in January 2016 for the 
first time in its history, Japan would warrant a very interesting platform for future research. If 
the negative interest rate could drive economic recovery, it would open up a new era for 
monetary policy. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
BRL ratio 0.0263 0.0219 0.0000 0.6765 
RSL ratio 0.0092 0.0093 0.0000 0.1958 
LnZscore 3.9335 0.5223 0.0000 5.6410 
Boone indicator -0.0542 0.0579 -1.6390 -0.0391 
Lerner index 0.2565 0.3365 -4.0314 12.4053 
Lending rate 0.0106 0.0024 0.0012 0.0366 
Size 14.5717 1.1591 12.0571 19.0109 
Capital ratio 0.0432 0.0240 -0.7882 0.1279 
Asset diversification 0.2394 0.0770 0.0000 0.4807 
Liquidity ratio 0.0722 0.0380 0.0089 0.3679 
Revenue diversification 0.2220 0.0817 0.0577 2.0619 
GDP growth 0.0032 0.0234 -0.0787 0.0543 
Bond yield 0.0122 0.0039 0.0041 0.0185 
Bank of Japan assets 18.7201 0.2530 18.3119 19.5192 
Market capitalisation 19.2235 0.2546 18.8248 19.6968 
Notes: This Table reports the descriptive statistics for key variables employed in the dynamic panel threshold 
analysis. Number of observations: 3491. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to 
assets, Z-score , lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills 
discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, 
liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, Bond yield: 
10-year Japanese government bond yield, Bank of Japan assets and market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. 
S.D.: Standard deviation.,  
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ /+=
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Table 2. Boone Indicator and Lerner Index per Bank Type. 
Variable Boone  Lerner 
Time City Regional 1 Regional 2  City Regional 1 Regional 2 
Sep-00 -0.0840 -0.0575 -0.0581  0.1337 0.2001 0.1732 
Mar-01 -0.1129 -0.0597 -0.0683  -0.1054 0.1321 0.1356 
Sep-01 -0.1332 -0.0605 -0.0886  -0.2174 0.1146 0.0830 
Mar-02 -0.1906 -0.0625 -0.0894  -0.7096 0.0647 0.0289 
Sep-02 -0.0517 -0.0535 -0.0795  0.0709 0.1813 0.1597 
Mar-03 -0.1206 -0.0515 -0.0810  -0.8319 0.1173 0.0257 
Sep-03 -0.0429 -0.0699 -0.0469  0.2166 0.2190 0.2822 
Mar-04 -0.0616 -0.0452 -0.0503  0.1374 0.3101 0.2645 
Sep-04 -0.0601 -0.0469 -0.0455  0.1992 0.3177 0.3030 
Mar-05 -0.0562 -0.0461 -0.0510  0.0917 0.5084 0.2993 
Sep-05 -0.0432 -0.0486 -0.0458  0.3346 0.3169 0.3385 
Mar-06 -0.0432 -0.0457 -0.0563  0.3082 0.3628 0.3086 
Sep-06 -0.0413 -0.0464 -0.0550  0.3191 0.3303 0.2757 
Mar-07 -0.0467 -0.0453 -0.0579  0.2326 0.3249 0.2593 
Sep-07 -0.0546 -0.0496 -0.0468  0.2172 0.2880 0.2889 
Mar-08 -0.0574 -0.0489 -0.0539  0.2117 0.2482 0.2143 
Sep-08 -0.0513 -0.0453 -0.0537  0.0899 0.1893 0.1809 
Mar-09 -0.0598 -0.0562 -0.0809  -0.0583 -0.0060 -0.0608 
Sep-09 -0.0428 -0.0433 -0.0452  0.1706 0.2947 0.2577 
Mar-10 -0.0445 -0.0443 -0.0493  0.2579 0.2994 0.2286 
Sep-10 -0.0483 -0.0440 -0.0453  0.3296 0.3270 0.3011 
Mar-11 -0.0435 -0.0442 -0.0442  0.2450 0.2942 0.2965 
Sep-11 -0.0458 -0.0438 -0.0446  0.3260 0.3461 0.3194 
Mar-12 -0.0579 -0.0464 -0.0438  0.3335 0.3280 0.3254 
Sep-12 -0.0513 -0.0436 -0.0435  0.2787 0.3167 0.3245 
Mar-13 -0.0586 -0.0605 -0.0426  0.3910 0.3630 0.3309 
Sep-13 -0.0916 -0.0519 -0.0437  0.4174 0.3879 0.3878 
Mar-14 -0.0419 -0.0612 -0.0439  0.3781 0.3673 0.3775 
Sep-14 -0.0450 -0.0642 -0.0430  0.4285 0.4013 0.3927 
Mar-15 -0.0438 -0.0663 -0.0451  0.3356 0.3895 0.3878 
Total -0.0654 -0.0518 -0.0559  0.1467 0.2777 0.2421 
Notes: This Table reports the average Boone indicator and the Lerner index per bank type over time. Sep: 
September; Mar: March; 00-15: 2000-2015. 
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Table 3. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Competition Nexus (Boone 
Indicator). 
 
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous 
variable (lending rate) as its instrument. The threshold variable is the Boone indicator. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans 
to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score , lending 
rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset 
diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest 
incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: 
number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
  
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ /+=
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates -0.0457 -0.0481 -0.1026 
95% confidence interval [ -0.0459  -0.0457] [-0.0493  -0.0457] [-0.1151  -0.0988] 
Impact of threshold variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime  -0.0571 0.0382 -0.0116 0.0097 0.3231* 0.1775 
High regime 0.5654*** 0.0849 0.4257*** 0.0554 1.1560*** 0.1676 
Intercept -0.0249*** 0.0044 -0.0152*** 0.0025 -0.1453*** 0.0240 
Impact of covariates       
Lending rate 0.0421*** 0.0032 0.0372*** 0.0020 0.182*** 0.0300 
Size -0.0002 0.0038 0.0096*** 0.0027 0.0758*** 0.0307 
Capital ratio -0.6081*** 0.1054 -0.1051*** 0.0421   
Asset diversification -0.0454*** 0.0091 -0.0128*** 0.0050 0.1204 0.1598 
Liquidity -0.0429*** 0.0096 -0.0084 0.0068 0.0982 0.2349 
Revenue diversification 0.0144* 0.0087 0.0125 0.0080 0.1927*** 0.0655 
GDP growth 0.0573*** 0.0074 0.0462*** 0.0046 0.2623*** 0.0596 
Market capitalisation -0.0029*** 0.0008 -0.0008 0.0005 0.0373*** 0.0090 
   
 
   
Obs in low regime 611  562  208  
Obs in high regime 2880  2929  3283  
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Table 4. Number of Observations in Each Regime for the Risk-Competition Nexus. 
 1 
 2  3 
 BRL ratio  RSL ratio  lnZ-score 
 -0.0457  -0.0481  -0.1026 
 Low  High   Low  High   Low  High  
Sep-00 41 87  37 91  11 117 
Mar-01 43 82  43 82  19 106 
Sep-01 42 86  42 86  20 108 
Mar-02 51 74  51 74  30 95 
Sep-02 17 110  17 110  10 117 
Mar-03 42 79  39 82  21 100 
Sep-03 13 108  13 108  5 116 
Mar-04 13 107  12 108  4 116 
Sep-04 13 107  9 111  3 117 
Mar-05 14 105  11 108  3 116 
Sep-05 10 109  8 111  4 115 
Mar-06 13 104  9 108  4 113 
Sep-06 11 106  8 109  2 115 
Mar-07 11 105  11 105  6 110 
Sep-07 12 103  11 104  2 113 
Mar-08 23 91  23 91  5 109 
Sep-08 29 86  28 87  4 111 
Mar-09 49 65  46 68  12 102 
Sep-09 5 109  5 109  0 114 
Mar-10 9 103  7 105  3 109 
Sep-10 5 106  3 108  1 110 
Mar-11 4 107  2 109  0 111 
Sep-11 6 105  3 108  0 111 
Mar-12 9 102  8 103  1 110 
Sep-12 7 103  3 107  0 110 
Mar-13 15 95  15 95  10 100 
Sep-13 17 93  15 95  5 105 
Mar-14 23 87  22 88  6 104 
Sep-14 29 81  27 83  9 101 
Mar-15 35 75  34 76  8 102 
Obs 611 2880  562 2929  208 3283 
Notes: This Tables report the number of observations in each regime over time for the risk-competition nexus, 
with the Boone indicator being the threshold value, and lending rate being the proxy for quantitative easing. 
Threshold values for the Boone indicator are obtained from the dynamic threshold analysis, reported in Table 3. 
BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
. The second row shows dependent variables, the third row shows the 
threshold values, the fourth row indicates low and high regimes, Mar: March, Sep: September, 00-15: 2000-2015, 
Obs: number of observations. 
 
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ /+=
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Table 5. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Competition Nexus (Boone Indicator and other proxies for Quantitative Easing). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable BRL ratio BRL ratio RSL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates -0.0457 -0.0457 -0.0481 -0.0481 -0.1026 -0.1026 
95% confidence interval [-0.0459  -0.0457] [ -0.0459  -0.0457] [ -0.0494  -0.0457] [ -0.0494  -0.0457] [ -0.1151  -0.0988] [ -0.1151  -0.0988] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime -0.0571 0.0374 -0.0571 0.0365 -0.0116 0.0092 -0.0116 0.0084 0.3226* 0.1815 0.3221* 0.1815 
High regime 0.5436*** 0.0881 0.5416*** 0.0982 0.407*** 0.0603 0.4066*** 0.0723 1.1667*** 0.1737 1.1679*** 0.1756 
Intercept -0.0241*** 0.0047 -0.024*** 0.0050 -0.0145*** 0.0027 -0.0145*** 0.0032 -0.1465*** 0.0245 -0.1467*** 0.0246 
Impact of covariates             
Yield 0.0153*** 0.0011   0.0136*** 0.0007   0.0675*** 0.0119   
BoJ assets   -0.0275*** 0.0021   -0.0244*** 0.0013   -0.1208*** 0.0214 
Size -0.0033 0.0037 -0.0039 0.0037 0.0069*** 0.0026 0.0064*** 0.0028 0.065** 0.0313 0.0627** 0.0310 
Capital ratio -0.5848*** 0.1028 -0.5772*** 0.1037 -0.0845** 0.0409 -0.0778* 0.0404     
Asset diversification -0.0592*** 0.0091 -0.0560*** 0.0096 -0.0249*** 0.0051 -0.0221*** 0.0057 0.0690 0.1596 0.0836 0.1630 
Liquidity -0.0127 0.0102 0.0082 0.0109 0.0183*** 0.0067 0.0368*** 0.0075 0.2391 0.2618 0.3328 0.2764 
Revenue diversification -0.0097*** 0.0034 -0.0071* 0.0037 -0.0089*** 0.0026 -0.0065** 0.0030 0.0910 0.0625 0.1030 0.0641 
GDP growth 0.0621*** 0.0082 0.0368*** 0.0082 0.0505*** 0.0058 0.0281*** 0.0055 0.2859*** 0.0596 0.1739*** 0.0673 
Market capitalisation -0.0074*** 0.0009 0.0014 0.0010 -0.0047*** 0.0006 0.0031*** 0.0006 0.0176 0.0120 0.0562*** 0.0079 
             
Obs in low regime 611  611  562  562  208  208  
Obs in high regime 2880  2880  2929  2929  3283  3283  
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (10-year Japanese government bond yield and the natural 
logarithm of the Bank of Japan Total assets) as its instrument. The threshold variable is the Boone indicator. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans 
to assets, Z-score , lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, 
asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in in natural 
logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ /+=
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Table 6. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Quantitative Easing Nexus (lending 
rate). 
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates 1.2052% 1.0562% 0.9401% 
95% confidence interval [0.9861% 1.2102%] [0.9613% 1.1205%] [0.9216% 1.0122%] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0088*** 0.0026 0.0063*** 0.0020 0.3416*** 0.0442 
High regime 0.0370*** 0.0090 0.0385*** 0.0036 0.2833*** 0.0751 
Intercept -0.1288*** 0.0417 -0.1469*** 0.0194 0.3061 0.2818 
Impact of covariates       
Boone -0.1359*** 0.0557 -0.079*** 0.0234 0.937*** 0.3350 
Size -0.014*** 0.0031 -0.0014 0.0022 0.1029*** 0.0356 
Capital ratio -0.5453*** 0.1079 -0.0560 0.0372   
Asset diversification -0.0791*** 0.0088 -0.0387*** 0.0055 0.1920 0.1889 
Liquidity -0.0619*** 0.0110 -0.0243*** 0.0076 0.1413 0.2368 
Revenue diversification -0.0068 0.0059 -0.0061 0.0042 0.2777*** 0.0771 
GDP growth 0.0387*** 0.0083 0.0297*** 0.0050 0.2827*** 0.0602 
Market capitalisation -0.002** 0.0009 -0.0003 0.0005 0.0374*** 0.0107 
       
Obs in low regime 2352  1789  1090  
Obs in high regime 959  1702  2401  
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous 
variable (Boone) as its instrument. The threshold variable is lending rate. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, 
RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score , lending rate=interest 
income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset 
diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest 
incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: 
number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ /+=
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Table 7. Number of Observations in Each Regime for the Risk-Quantitative Easing Nexus. 
 1  2  3 
 BRL ratio  RSL ratio   lnZ-score 
 1.2052%  1.0562%  0.9401% 
 Low  High   Low  High   Low  High  
Sep-00 46 82  5 123  0 128 
Mar-01 45 80  2 123  0 125 
Sep-01 58 70  18 110  1 127 
Mar-02 60 65  35 90  2 123 
Sep-02 63 64  35 92  5 122 
Mar-03 65 56  36 85  9 112 
Sep-03 68 53  41 80  14 107 
Mar-04 74 46  44 76  15 105 
Sep-04 71 49  47 73  16 104 
Mar-05 78 41  54 65  25 94 
Sep-05 84 35  55 64  31 88 
Mar-06 90 27  61 56  41 76 
Sep-06 92 25  61 56  33 84 
Mar-07 80 36  53 63  19 97 
Sep-07 76 39  38 77  5 110 
Mar-08 75 39  37 77  2 112 
Sep-08 79 36  38 77  5 110 
Mar-09 87 27  52 62  10 104 
Sep-09 94 20  66 48  25 89 
Mar-10 96 16  71 41  43 69 
Sep-10 97 14  78 33  50 61 
Mar-11 102 9  82 29  62 49 
Sep-11 103 8  86 25  68 43 
Mar-12 106 5  91 20  75 36 
Sep-12 104 6  94 16  78 32 
Mar-13 106 4  98 12  85 25 
Sep-13 107 3  99 11  88 22 
Mar-14 108 2  101 9  90 20 
Sep-14 109 1  105 5  96 14 
Mar-15 109 1  106 4  97 13 
Obs 2532 959  1789 1702  1090 2401 
Notes: This Tables report the number of observations in each regime over time for the risk-quantitative easing 
nexus, with lending rate being the threshold variable, and the Boone indicator being the proxy for competition. 
Threshold values of lending rate are obtained from the dynamic threshold analysis, reported in Table 6. BRL ratio: 
bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
. The second row shows dependent variables, the third row shows the threshold values, the fourth row indicates 
low and high regimes, Mar: March, Sep: September, 00-15: 2000-2015, Obs: number of observations. 
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ /+=
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Table 8. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Quantitative Easing Nexus (10-year Japanese government bond yield and Bank of 
Japan assets) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold variable Yield Yield Yield BOJ assets BOJ assets BOJ assets 
Threshold estimates 1.032% 1.032% 1.484% 118,437,502 mil JPN 118,437,502 mil JPN 118,437,502 mil JPN 
95% confidence interval [1.032% 1.032%] [1.032% 1.032%] [1.484% 1.484%] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime -0.017*** 0.0014 -0.0149*** 0.0010 0.0856*** 0.0113 -0.0347*** 0.0098 -0.0286*** 0.0050 -0.1219 0.0929 
High regime 0.0131*** 0.0049 0.0107*** 0.0028 0.6513*** 0.1882 0.0007 0.0015 -0.0010 0.0010 -0.1709*** 0.0194 
Intercept -0.1427*** 0.0253 -0.1222*** 0.0151 -2.2627*** 0.8002 0.6492*** 0.1814 0.504*** 0.0910 -0.9858 1.9967 
Impact of covariates             
Boone -0.1837*** 0.0528 -0.122*** 0.0296 0.7841*** 0.2696 -0.1767*** 0.0530 -0.1151*** 0.0273 0.8562*** 0.2814 
Size -0.0232*** 0.0035 -0.0095*** 0.0026 0.058** 0.0295 -0.0245*** 0.0031 -0.0108*** 0.0023 0.0543* 0.0283 
Capital ratio -0.4923*** 0.1082 -0.0085 0.0390   -0.4981*** 0.1034 -0.0142 0.0362   
Asset diversification -0.1008*** 0.0087 -0.0602*** 0.0053 0.1431 0.1502 -0.1093*** 0.0087 -0.0691*** 0.0051 0.0609 0.1414 
Liquidity -0.0737*** 0.0111 -0.0326*** 0.0078 0.2455 0.2653 -0.0897*** 0.0116 -0.0474*** 0.0078 0.1494 0.2634 
Revenue diversification -0.0178*** 0.0046 -0.016*** 0.0035 0.1182* 0.0606 -0.0197*** 0.0043 -0.0181*** 0.0033 0.1033* 0.0562 
GDP growth 0.0847*** 0.0119 0.0712*** 0.0078 0.3185*** 0.0741 0.0081 0.0083 -0.0018 0.0053 -0.0463 0.0750 
Market capitalisation -0.0113*** 0.0018 -0.0083*** 0.0012 0.0479*** 0.0082 0.0002 0.0011 0.0028*** 0.0006 0.1032*** 0.0067 
             
Obs in low regime 1114  1114  2898  1156  1156  1156  
Obs in high regime 2377  2377  593  2335  2335  2335  
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (Boone) as its instrument. The threshold variable is the 
10-year Japanese government bond yield and Bank of Japan (BOJ) assets. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
, lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset 
diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural 
logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
( ) itititit ROAratioCapitalROAZ /+=
48 
 
Table 9. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Competition-Quantitative Easing Nexus. 
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable Boone Boone Boone 
Threshold variable Lending rate Lending rate Lending rate 
Threshold estimates 0.8496% 0.6935% 0.7397% 
95% confidence interval [0.7274% 0.9307%] [0.6925% 0.921%] [0.7028% 0.8084%] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0905*** 0.0233 0.0667 0.0417 0.1095** 0.0510 
High regime -0.0657*** 0.0226 -0.0276*** 0.0102 -0.0805*** 0.0260 
Intercept 0.7444*** 0.1201 0.4389** 0.2130 0.9231*** 0.1936 
Impact of covariates       
BRL ratio -0.0151 0.3644     
RSL ratio   -0.5595 0.4007   
lnZ-score     0.3487*** 0.1058 
Size -0.0083 0.0173 -0.0052 0.0152 -0.0091 0.0186 
Capital ratio 0.5151 0.3782 0.4606*** 0.1868   
Asset diversification -0.0406 0.0407 -0.0431 0.0386 -0.0415 0.0682 
Liquidity -0.1226*** 0.0505 -0.1315*** 0.0489 -0.1015 0.0796 
Revenue diversification 0.0345 0.0268 0.0296 0.0252 0.0065 0.0437 
GDP growth 0.0716* 0.0419 0.0886*** 0.0398 -0.0507 0.0596 
Market capitalisation 0.0051 0.0032 0.0049* 0.0027 -0.0088* 0.0046 
       
Obs in low regime 624  181  287  
Obs in high regime 2867  3310  3204  
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous 
variable (BRL ratio, RSL ratio, or lnZ-score) as its instrument. The threshold variable is lending rate. BRL ratio: 
bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
, lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, 
asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest 
incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: 
number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
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Table 10. Number of Observations in Each Regime for the Competition - Quantitative Easing 
Nexus (Boone indicator and lending rate). 
 1 2 3 
 0.8496% 0.6935% 0.7397% 
 BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
 Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  
Sep-00 0 128 0 128 0 128 
Mar-01 0 125 0 125 0 125 
Sep-01 0 128 0 128 0 128 
Mar-02 1 124 0 125 0 125 
Sep-02 0 127 0 127 0 127 
Mar-03 1 120 1 120 1 120 
Sep-03 2 119 0 121 0 121 
Mar-04 3 117 0 120 0 120 
Sep-04 3 117 0 120 1 119 
Mar-05 4 115 1 118 1 118 
Sep-05 3 116 0 119 0 119 
Mar-06 7 110 0 117 2 115 
Sep-06 5 112 0 117 0 117 
Mar-07 2 114 1 115 1 115 
Sep-07 0 115 0 115 0 115 
Mar-08 0 114 0 114 0 114 
Sep-08 0 115 0 115 0 115 
Mar-09 1 113 0 114 0 114 
Sep-09 2 112 0 114 0 114 
Mar-10 9 103 0 112 1 111 
Sep-10 17 94 1 110 2 109 
Mar-11 27 84 1 110 2 109 
Sep-11 36 75 1 110 3 108 
Mar-12 51 60 3 108 8 103 
Sep-12 56 54 6 104 22 88 
Mar-13 71 39 14 96 27 83 
Sep-13 75 35 23 87 42 68 
Mar-14 80 30 33 77 50 60 
Sep-14 82 28 45 65 57 53 
Mar-15 86 24 51 59 67 43 
Obs 624 2867 181 3310 287 3204 
Notes: This Tables report the number of observations in each regime over time for the competition-quantitative 
easing nexus, with lending rate being the threshold variable, the Boone indicator being the dependent variable. 
Threshold values are obtained from the dynamic threshold analysis, reported in Table 9. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans 
to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score . The second 
row shows the threshold values, the third row shows the endogenous variable used in each model specification, 
the fourth row indicates low and high regimes, Mar: March, Sep: September, 00-15: 2000-2015, Obs: number of 
observations. 
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Table 11. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Competition-Quantitative Easing Nexus (Boone Indicator and other proxies for 
Quantitative Easing) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Threshold variable Yield Yield Yield BoJ assets BoJ assets BoJ assets 
Threshold estimates 1.330% 1.685% 1.330%  121,771,462 mil JPN  124,746,221 mil JPN  121,771,462 mil JPN  
95% confidence interval [1.33% 1.415%] [1.33% 1.685%] [1.33% 1.415%] 
[119,777,762  
126,958,482] 
[118,437,506  
126,208,495] 
[106,002,035  
216,697,081] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0149*** 0.0035 0.0113*** 0.0030 0.009*** 0.0036 -0.0678*** 0.0262 -0.0606*** 0.0240 -0.0482* 0.0279 
High regime 0.0655*** 0.0194 0.5397*** 0.1971 0.042** 0.0201 -0.0233*** 0.0047 -0.0213*** 0.0068 -0.0070 0.0061 
Intercept -0.2102*** 0.0873 -2.1249*** 0.7925 -0.1344 0.0908 0.8180* 0.4895 0.7236 0.4703 0.7625 0.5488 
Impact of covariates             
BRL ratio -0.6179 0.5332     -0.5277** 0.2597     
RSL ratio   -0.9872** 0.4582     -0.9149* 0.5102   
lnZ-score     0.0509 0.0749     0.0888 0.0766 
Size 0.0000 0.0202 0.0001 0.0163 0.0103 0.0156 -0.0020 0.0166 -0.0005 0.0159 0.0081 0.0147 
Capital ratio 0.1163 0.5167 0.4185 0.2912   0.1832 0.3176 0.4294 0.2941   
Asset diversification -0.0042 0.0707 -0.0017 0.0514 0.0627* 0.0380 -0.0066 0.0425 -0.0157 0.0595 0.0582 0.0408 
Liquidity -0.1293** 0.0574 -0.1257*** 0.0518 -0.0876 0.0579 -0.1362*** 0.0555 -0.1341** 0.0588 -0.0961 0.0614 
Revenue diversification 0.0213 0.0206 0.0177 0.0209 0.0349* 0.0199 0.0193 0.0207 0.0122 0.0215 0.0296* 0.0178 
GDP growth 0.1291*** 0.0452 0.1521*** 0.0428 0.0799* 0.0476 0.0972*** 0.0324 0.1322*** 0.0423 0.0726* 0.0427 
Market capitalisation -0.0136*** 0.0051 -0.0053* 0.0032 -0.0081 0.0062 0.0022 0.0032 0.0014 0.0039 -0.0046 0.0068 
             
Obs in low regime 1824  3246  1824  1409  1520  1409  
Obs in high regime 1667  245  1667  2082  1971  2082  
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (BRL ratio, RSL ratio, or lnZ-score) as its instrument. 
The threshold variable is the 10-year Japanese government bond yield (Yield) and the Bank of Japan total assets (BoJ assets). BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: 
restructured loans to assets, Z-score , lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital 
ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market 
capitalisation is in natural lo-3garithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
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Table 12. Variance Decompositions. 
 1 2 3 
Periods Variables QE Boone BRL ratio Variables QE Boone RSL ratio Variables QE Boone lnZ-score 
5 QE 0.9997 0.0001 0.0002 QE 0.9997 0.0001 0.0002 QE 0.9888 0.0004 0.0108 
5 Boone 0.0438 0.9561 0.0000 Boone 0.0292 0.9683 0.0025 Boone 0.0567 0.8303 0.1130 
5 BRL ratio 0.2801 0.0765 0.6434 RSL ratio 0.1168 0.0166 0.8667 lnZ-score 0.0039 0.1429 0.8532 
10 QE 0.9996 0.0001 0.0003 QE 0.9992 0.0001 0.0007 QE 0.9686 0.0012 0.0301 
10 Boone 0.0835 0.9164 0.0000 Boone 0.0614 0.9350 0.0036 Boone 0.1030 0.7729 0.1240 
10 BRL ratio 0.4679 0.0566 0.4756 RSL ratio 0.3089 0.0126 0.6785 lnZ-score 0.0068 0.1279 0.8653 
Notes: This Table reports the variance decompositions of the panel vector autoregression model for 5 and 10 periods ahead. There are 3 models, each has 3 variables: quantitative 
easing QE proxied by the lending rate, competition proxied by the Boone indicator, and risk. Column 1: risk is represented as bankrupt loan (BRL) ratio, column 2: risk is 
restructured loan (RSL) ratio, column 3: risk is taken as ln Z-score, . 
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Figure 1. The Boone Indicator and the Lerner Index 
 
Notes: This Figure illustrates the average values of the Boone indicator and the Lerner index over time. Year 
denotes financial year. 
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions-Bankrupt loan ratio 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with respect to 
one standard deviation shock in other variables. QE: Quantitative easing proxied by bank lending rate; Boone is 
the Boone indicator of competition; BRL_ratio is bankrupt loan ratio; step: number of periods. Errors are 5% on 
each side generated by Monte-Carlo simulation. 
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions-Restructured loan ratio 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with respect to 
one standard deviation shock in other variables. QE: Quantitative easing proxied by bank lending rates; Boone is 
the Boone indicator of competition; RSL_ratio is restructured loan ratio; step: number of periods. Errors are 5% 
on each side generated by Monte-Carlo simulation. 
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions-Bank stability 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with respect to 
one standard deviation shock in other variables. QE: Quantitative easing proxied by bank lending rate; Boone is 
the Boone indicator of competition; lnz is the natural logarithm of Z-score ; 
step: number of periods. Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo simulation. 
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Table A1. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Competition Nexus (Lerner 
Index). 
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates 0.2661 0.2835 0.4117 
95% confidence interval [-0.1724  0.3027] [0.2728  0.3433] [0.3997  0.4164] 
Impact of threshold variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime -0.0116* 0.0061 -0.005*** 0.0016 0.1878*** 0.0354 
High regime -0.0018* 0.0010 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0091 0.0059 
Intercept 0.0047*** 0.0009 0.0023*** 0.0004 -0.1046*** 0.0180 
Impact of covariates       
Lending rate 0.039*** 0.0031 0.0347*** 0.0017 0.2387*** 0.0340 
Size -0.0007 0.0038 0.0094*** 0.0026 0.0762*** 0.0302 
Capital ratio -0.6053*** 0.1046 -0.0997*** 0.0393   
Asset diversification -0.0443*** 0.0104 -0.0161*** 0.0047 0.0214 0.1316 
Liquidity -0.0345*** 0.0104 -0.0045 0.0063 -0.0279 0.1979 
Revenue diversification 0.0216*** 0.0053 0.0142*** 0.0029 0.1527*** 0.0576 
GDP growth 0.064*** 0.0072 0.0438*** 0.0047 0.0674 0.0910 
Market capitalisation -0.0013* 0.0008 0.0003 0.0005 0.0131 0.0117 
   
 
   
Obs in low regime 1160  1392  3134  
Obs in high regime 2331  2099  357  
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous 
variable (lending rate) as its instrument. The threshold variable is the Lerner index. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to 
assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score , lending 
rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset 
diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest 
incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: 
number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Table A2. Number of Observations in Each Regime for the Risk-Competition Nexus (Lerner 
index). 
 1 2 3 
 BRL ratio RSL ratio Z-score 
 0.2661 0.2835 0.4117 
Time Low  High  Low  High  Low  High  
Sep-00 68 60 89 39 128 0 
Mar-01 85 40 97 28 123 2 
Sep-01 95 33 105 23 127 1 
Mar-02 99 26 107 18 124 1 
Sep-02 69 58 81 46 125 2 
Mar-03 88 33 102 19 119 2 
Sep-03 42 79 53 68 116 5 
Mar-04 37 83 50 70 115 5 
Sep-04 25 95 32 88 107 13 
Mar-05 27 92 34 85 101 18 
Sep-05 14 105 18 101 104 15 
Mar-06 14 103 23 94 90 27 
Sep-06 15 102 17 100 101 16 
Mar-07 25 91 28 88 98 18 
Sep-07 22 93 29 86 107 8 
Mar-08 48 66 60 54 110 4 
Sep-08 84 31 90 25 115 0 
Mar-09 100 14 105 9 114 0 
Sep-09 47 67 56 58 111 3 
Mar-10 39 73 50 62 110 2 
Sep-10 16 95 20 91 104 7 
Mar-11 30 81 43 68 109 2 
Sep-11 13 98 17 94 94 17 
Mar-12 18 93 25 86 98 13 
Sep-12 19 91 26 84 98 12 
Mar-13 11 99 22 88 86 24 
Sep-13 3 107 6 104 72 38 
Mar-14 2 108 2 108 86 24 
Sep-14 0 110 0 110 69 41 
Mar-15 5 105 5 105 73 37 
Obs 1160 2331 1392 2099 3134 357 
Notes: This Tables report the number of observations in each regime over time for the risk-competition nexus. 
The Lerner index is the proxy for competition, while lending rate is the proxy for quantitative easing. Threshold 
values are obtained from the dynamic threshold analysis, reported in Table A2. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to 
assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score . The second row 
shows the threshold values, the third row shows the endogenous variable used in each model specification, the 
fourth row indicates low and high regimes, Mar: March, Sep: September, 00-15: 2000-2015, Obs: number of 
observations. 
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Table A3. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Competition Nexus (Lerner index and other proxies for Quantitative Easing). 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable BRL ratio BRL ratio RSL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates 0.2661 0.2661 0.2835 0.2835 0.4117 0.4117 
95% confidence 
interval [-0.1724  0.3003] [-0.1724  0.3039] [0.2728  0.3433] [0.2707  0.3436] [0.3997  0.4164] [0.3997  0.4163] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime -0.0115* 0.0060 -0.0115* 0.0060 -0.005*** 0.0016 -0.005*** 0.0015 0.1878*** 0.0358 0.1879*** 0.0362 
High regime -0.0016* 0.0009 -0.0017* 0.0009 -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0074 0.0078 -0.0082 0.0077 
Intercept 0.0048*** 0.0009 0.0046*** 0.0009 0.0024*** 0.0004 0.0023*** 0.0005 -0.1032*** 0.0203 -0.1042*** 0.0211 
Impact of covariates             
Yield 0.0143*** 0.0012   0.0128*** 0.0007   0.0867*** 0.0138   
BoJ assets   -0.0258*** 0.0021   -0.023*** 0.0013   -0.1552*** 0.0252 
Size -0.0034 0.0038 -0.0039 0.0038 0.007*** 0.0027 0.0066*** 0.0028 0.0598* 0.0307 0.0566* 0.0307 
Capital ratio -0.5839*** 0.1027 -0.5769*** 0.1034 -0.0806** 0.0380 -0.0744** 0.0375     
Asset diversification -0.0562*** 0.0104 -0.0535*** 0.0108 -0.0267*** 0.0052 -0.0243*** 0.0058 -0.0487 0.1275 -0.0313 0.1313 
Liquidity -0.0061 0.0116 0.0134 0.0123 0.0208*** 0.0068 0.0383*** 0.0074 0.1540 0.2300 0.2732 0.2487 
Revenue diversification -0.0011 0.0051 0.0016 0.0054 -0.0059* 0.0031 -0.0035 0.0036 0.0156 0.0509 0.0318 0.0530 
GDP growth 0.0694*** 0.0080 0.0454*** 0.0079 0.0486*** 0.0058 0.0271*** 0.0057 0.0963 0.0913 -0.0484 0.1066 
Market capitalisation -0.0055*** 0.0008 0.0027*** 0.0010 -0.0034*** 0.0006 0.0038*** 0.0006 -0.0120 0.0156 0.0375*** 0.0101 
             
Obs in low regime 1160  1160  1392  1392  3134  3134  
Obs in high regime 2331  2331  2099  2099  357  357  
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (10-year Japanese government bond yield and the natural 
logarithm of the Bank of Japan Total assets) as its instrument. The threshold variable is the Lerner index. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to 
assets, Z-score , lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, 
asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural 
logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level. 
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Table A4. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Quantitative Easing Nexus 
(lending rate and Lerner index). 
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold estimates 1.2052% 1.0554% 0.6929% 
95% confidence interval [1.1976% 1.2102%] [0.9847% 1.1212%] [0.6922% 0.7089%] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0249*** 0.0024 0.0145*** 0.0015 0.6754*** 0.2843 
High regime 0.054*** 0.0085 0.049*** 0.0033 0.0083 0.0498 
Intercept -0.1340*** 0.0378 -0.1575*** 0.0153 3.3572*** 1.3170 
Impact of covariates       
Lerner -0.0054 0.0045 -0.001 0.0015 0.2069*** 0.0306 
Size -0.0045 0.0028 0.0036* 0.0021 -0.0160 0.0357 
Capital ratio -0.6234*** 0.0999 -0.1048*** 0.0425   
Asset diversification -0.0566*** 0.0102 -0.0285*** 0.0058 -0.1910 0.1678 
Liquidity -0.043*** 0.0109 -0.0125* 0.0067 0.0612 0.2138 
Revenue diversification 0.0178* 0.0091 0.002 0.0035 -0.2582*** 0.0726 
GDP growth 0.0427*** 0.0078 0.0282*** 0.0043 -0.0771 0.0723 
Market capitalisation -0.0023*** 0.0009 -0.0005 0.0005 0.0288*** 0.0117 
       
Obs in low regime 2352  1784  179  
Obs in high regime 959  1707  3312  
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous 
variable (Lerner index) as its instrument. The threshold variable is lending rate. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to 
assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score , lending 
rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset 
diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest 
incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: 
number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
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Table A5. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Risk-Quantitative Easing Nexus (10-year Japanese government bond yield, Bank of Japan 
assets, and Lerner index) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dependent variable BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score BRL ratio RSL ratio lnZ-score 
Threshold variable Yield Yield Yield BOJ assets BOJ assets BOJ assets 
Threshold estimates 0.709% 1.032% 1.484% 118,437,502 mil JPN 118,437,502 mil JPN 118,437,502 mil JPN 
95% confidence interval [0.709% 1.032%] [0.709% 1.032%] [1.484% 1.484%] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
[118,437,502  
118,437,502] 
[113,693,826  
118,437,502] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0081*** 0.0015 -0.0117*** 0.0009 -0.0072 0.0117 -0.045*** 0.0083 -0.0339*** 0.0043 -0.0204 0.0943 
High regime 0.0238*** 0.0020 0.0169*** 0.0023 0.4954*** 0.1927 -0.0169*** 0.0014 -0.0097*** 0.0008 0.0245 0.0197 
Intercept -0.0651*** 0.0121 -0.1359*** 0.0131 -2.0014*** 0.8190 0.5089*** 0.1540 0.4399*** 0.0795 0.8089 2.0389 
Impact of covariates             
Lerner -0.0053 0.0047 0.0020 0.0014 0.191*** 0.0512 -0.0054 0.0047 0.0008 0.0015 0.1869*** 0.0503 
Size -0.0107*** 0.0033 -0.0039* 0.0022 -0.0573** 0.0282 -0.0139*** 0.0029 -0.0053*** 0.0020 -0.0523* 0.0269 
Capital ratio -0.5889*** 0.0995 -0.0814* 0.0448   -0.5913*** 0.0949 -0.0817* 0.0437   
Asset diversification -0.0795*** 0.0105 -0.053*** 0.0054 -0.1529 0.1694 -0.0917*** 0.0105 -0.0623*** 0.0052 -0.1914 0.1622 
Liquidity -0.0291*** 0.0118 -0.0041 0.0071 0.0405 0.2623 -0.0507*** 0.0123 -0.0221*** 0.0072 -0.0286 0.2642 
Revenue diversification -0.0019 0.0110 -0.0205*** 0.0041 -0.4013*** 0.0939 -0.0032 0.0110 -0.0189*** 0.0039 -0.4069*** 0.0902 
GDP growth 0.0694*** 0.0075 0.0653*** 0.0058 -0.0925 0.1230 -0.0156** 0.0072 -0.0218*** 0.0040 -0.1059 0.1288 
Market capitalisation -0.0127*** 0.0014 -0.0108*** 0.0010 0.0766*** 0.0119 0.0054*** 0.0011 0.0051*** 0.0006 0.0369*** 0.0084 
             
Obs in low regime 671  1114  2898  1156  1156  1156  
Obs in high regime 2820  2377  593  2335  2335  2335  
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (Lerner index) as its instrument. The threshold variable 
is the 10-year Japanese government bond yield and Bank of Japan (BOJ) assets. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
, lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset 
diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in natural 
logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.   
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Table A6. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Competition-Quantitative Easing 
Nexus (Lerner index and lending rate). 
 1 2 3 
Dependent variable Lerner Lerner Lerner 
Threshold variable Lending rate Lending rate Lending rate 
Threshold estimates 0.6925% 0.6925% 0.6922% 
95% confidence interval [0.6925% 0.6931%] [0.6925% 0.6931%] [0.6922% 0.7028%] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime -0.3378*** 0.1323 -0.3415*** 0.1325 -0.3098** 0.1396 
High regime -0.0467* 0.0243 -0.0268 0.0182 -0.0725*** 0.0223 
Intercept -1.4765** 0.6572 -1.5923*** 0.6568 -1.2034* 0.6585 
Impact of covariates       
BRL ratio -0.2179 0.6517     
RSL ratio   -0.9287* 0.5479   
lnZ-score     0.2983*** 0.1172 
Size -0.0209 0.0179 -0.0159 0.0149 -0.0136 0.0178 
Capital ratio 0.5714 0.5851 0.614* 0.3399   
Asset diversification 0.0786 0.0629 0.0659 0.0447 0.1044* 0.0517 
Liquidity -0.0787 0.0642 -0.0767 0.0546 -0.0290 0.0614 
Revenue diversification 0.1871*** 0.0339 0.1831*** 0.0336 0.1747*** 0.0470 
GDP growth 0.3219*** 0.0667 0.3421*** 0.0619 0.2116*** 0.0663 
Market capitalisation 0.0195*** 0.0046 0.0196*** 0.0038 0.0078 0.0056 
       
Obs in low regime 177  177  176  
Obs in high regime 3314  3314  3315  
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous 
variable (BRL ratio, RSL ratio, or lnZ-score) as its instrument. The threshold variable is the bank specific lending 
rate. BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: restructured loans to assets, Z-score
, lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, 
size=ln(total assets), capital ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid 
assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market capitalisation is in 
natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 
5%, 10% level.  
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Table A7. Dynamic Panel Threshold Analysis for the Competition-Quantitative Easing Nexus (Lerner index and other proxies for Quantitative 
Easing) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Threshold variable Yield Yield Yield BoJ assets BoJ assets BoJ assets 
Threshold estimates 1.330% 1.330% 1.330% 124,746,234 mil JPN 124,746,234 mil JPN 124,746,234 mil JPN 
95% confidence interval [1.33% 1.685%] [1.26% 1.33%] [1.26% 1.33%] 
[118,437,502  
124,746,234] 
[119,777,762  
124,746,234] 
[109,020,450  
144,384,522] 
Impact of threshold 
variables Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. Est. S.e. 
Low regime 0.0131** 0.0059 0.0132*** 0.0053 0.0104* 0.0053 -0.0741*** 0.0244 -0.0713*** 0.0246 -0.056* 0.0288 
High regime 0.0553*** 0.0205 0.0525*** 0.0205 0.0333 0.0234 -0.0207*** 0.0082 -0.0112 0.0082 -0.0079 0.0075 
Intercept -0.1695* 0.0980 -0.1558 0.0974 -0.0866 0.1092 0.9781** 0.4859 1.1064** 0.5179 0.8833 0.5902 
Impact of covariates             
BRL ratio -0.6423 0.4896     -0.6768 0.4967     
RSL ratio   -0.0093* 0.0049     -0.0056 0.0052   
lnZ-score     0.0169 0.0889     0.0326 0.0928 
Size 0.0030 0.0197 -0.0045 0.0192 0.0177 0.0163 0.0033 0.0194 0.0009 0.0187 0.0183 0.0156 
Capital ratio 0.2466 0.4829 0.6435* 0.3352   0.2345 0.4831 0.6488* 0.3331   
Asset diversification 0.0816 0.0697 0.0747 0.0478 0.162*** 0.0600 0.0672 0.0765 0.0898* 0.0525 0.1529*** 0.0600 
Liquidity -0.0935 0.0659 -0.0722 0.0667 -0.0333 0.0828 -0.1229* 0.0730 -0.1027 0.0683 -0.0608 0.0850 
Revenue diversification 0.2953*** 0.0993 0.2857*** 0.1036 0.3168*** 0.0884 0.2904*** 0.0999 0.2896*** 0.1053 0.3112*** 0.0891 
GDP growth 0.3204*** 0.0570 0.3059*** 0.0564 0.2823*** 0.0631 0.359*** 0.0591 0.3521*** 0.0574 0.3281*** 0.0703 
Market capitalisation 0.0101* 0.0056 0.0178*** 0.0057 0.0166*** 0.0071 0.0171*** 0.0047 0.0185** 0.0083 0.0149* 0.0090 
             
Obs in low regime 1824  1824  1824  1520  1520  1520  
Obs in high regime 1667  1667  1667  1971  1971  1971  
Notes: This Tables report the results from the dynamic threshold analysis using the first lag of the endogenous variable (BRL and RSL ratio, or lnZ-score) as its instrument. 
The threshold variable is the 10-year Japanese government bond yield (Yield) and the Bank of Japan total assets (BoJ assets).  BRL ratio: bankrupt loans to assets, RSL ratio: 
restructured loans to assets, Z-score , lending rate=interest income on loans/loans and bills discounted, size=ln(total assets), capital 
ratio=equity/assets, asset diversification=securities/assets, liquidity=liquid assets/total assets, revenue diversification=non-interest incomes/operating income, market 
capitalisation is in natural logarithm. Est.: estimate, S.e.: standard error, Obs: number of observations. ***,**,*: significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
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